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Abstract: 
This paper is an innovative addition to the ongoing debate about human-animal relations. It 
approaches the topic from the perspective of political economy rather than moral philosophy 
and seeks to provide an explanatory framework combining commodification of animals and 
death in the global economy. While acknowledging the importance of the ongoing debate 
about animal rights, it seeks to shift the focus of analysis of industries which create value 
through the killing of animals toward one based on the Foucauldian notions of power as 
biopolitics and governance. In order to reconceptualise the relations of power which exist 
between human business interests and animal life, it introduces the notion that animals killed 
for meat, by-products, or research purposes are treated as necrocommodities; that is, 
commodities whose value is created as a direct result of death.  By challenging the prevalent 
notions of speciesist hierarchisation and property rights, it seeks to cast a new light on the 
tangible power relations which exist between humans and animal species which are hunted or 
fished for profit. In doing so, this paper challenges the notion that the economy is amoral. 
Instead, it presents a preliminary picture of an economy rooted in inter-species power 
relations which is necessarily subject to a moral critique. The case study of the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) and ongoing “scientific” whaling is used to elucidate and introduce 
the concept of necroeconomics, but the main goal is to present an analytical framework that 
has a bearing on wider moral and structural issues in the international animal and animal 
product industry. Moreover, it situates animal-human relations within broader problems of 
modernity, thereby broadening its scope and calling for more academic focus on the place of 
animals in the modern political economy and its attendant circuits of power. 
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“The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals 
are treated.”  
- Mohandas Gandhi 
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Introduction 
“The three harpoon boats had spread out over the night in an arc of fifteen miles. One 
of them returned to the Nisshin Maru with a whale in tow and quickly transferred it to 
the flensing deck. Within minutes, thick red blood could be seen pouring from the 
scupper holes on both sides of the ship into the sea.”
1 
 
This brief, almost clinical blurb appeared in a news release from the Sea 
Shepherd Society on February 2, 2010. It describes the physical process of the hunt, 
harpooning and subsequent processing of a minke whale by the Japanese “scientific” 
whaling fleet. But this action, its causes, and its implications, are the centre of intense 
controversy among world governments and civil society groups (both within the 
debate about whaling and, more broadly, in the debate about wildlife conservation). 
Moreover, as this paper will argue, it speaks to a broader inter-species power 
relationship wherein animals2 are deprived of life – physical, moral, and political – in 
the name of anthropocentric economic and scientific interests. Indeed, the end of 
animal life in many instances in the moment in which a commodity – defined as 
anything of value, be it commercial value or scientific knowledge – is created. 
The whale will undergo scientific tests – perhaps about its diet or general 
health – and then be cut into meat which will be sold in the Japanese market. Under 
                                                 
1 “Death in the Ross Sea - Whale Killed by the Japanese Whalers.” Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. Feb 5, 2009. 
http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090205-1.html. Accessed on Feb. 2, 2010. 
2 The terms “animal,” “nonhuman,” “nonhuman animal,” “fauna,” and “nonhuman fauna” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper to refer to all sentient beings other than human beings. I recognize that this vernacular is itself the subject 
of some debate and that for some scholars these various words connote different and sometimes conflicting meanings. I also 
recognize that lumping all animals which are not human into one group, which is specifically distinct from the human species, is 
to some degree problematic. However, for the purposes of this paper, I feel that all of these terms are apt and their meaning 
throughout is intended to be non-normative and fully interchangeable.  
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the auspices of the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) Convention, this is a 
legal activity. Indeed, from a strictly economic viewpoint, it is inherently ordinary: a 
natural resource is being used to create value. The same could be said of the scientific 
perspective: a sample is being tested to deepen a body of knowledge. And yet, this 
action, this death, is not only highly controversial but highly problematic and, as will 
be argued, representative of ills that lie at the very heart of modernity. This paper will 
tell a story of culture, morality, property, and power. In doing so, it will show that 
there is no framework in existence which sufficiently answers the simple question of 
why animals die so that people can make money. 
 The broadest intellectual battlefield with regards to animals, their use by 
humans, and the notions of conservation, preservation, and sustainability, is an area 
that might be termed for simplicity’s sake the animal rights debate. This is certainly an 
important debate, and this paper will acknowledge its contribution to the struggle to 
improve the lot of animals. However, I will argue that this approach is insufficient in 
that it overlooks the structural aspects of modern political economy which enshrine 
speciesism and provide the impetus for most mistreatment and murder of animals by 
humans. This line of inquiry, in turn, helps embed the animal rights question within 
bigger questions about politics, science, and modern society. 
This paper will begin with a brief genealogy of the religious, social, and 
philosophical underpinnings of the human-animal relationship. It will then move on to 
an overview of the prevalent Western notions of private ownership and the “right” to 
property, rooted in John Locke’s work on jurisprudence, and Karl Polanyi’s notion of 
“fictitious commodities.” Having established this foundation, the paper will examine in 
detail the animal rights debate, including its points of consensus and divergence, as 
well as the position taken by its critics. At this juncture, however, my trajectory will 
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diverge from the established narrative. I will argue that the animal rights debate is 
limited as an analytical tool of the animal-commodity industry because its ontology 
misses the structural and socially-propagated reasons for much mistreatment and 
killing of animals. This paper seeks instead to develop a new analytical model based 
on Michel Foucault’s work on (bio)power, sovereignty, and racism, and Achille 
Mbembe’s notion of “necropolitics.” I will argue that a Foucauldian framework which 
considers the human-animal relationship as one rooted in complex and dynamic, 
socially constructed power relations is necessary to expand both the animal rights 
debate and the broader critique of modernity.  
I will contend that human-nonhuman relations are based on the “racist” 
hierarchization of species (I will seek here to expand the concept of “speciesism”) and 
the deployment of a system akin to Mbembe’s “necropower” on animal populations. 
This will show that rather than animals simply being denied “rights,” they are 
transformed by specific processes into what I dub necrocommodities, that is 
commodities created out of the negation of an animal’s very being within the 
everyday functions of the animal product and animal science industries. This  provides 
me a new avenue for looking at human-animal relations from a power- political-
economy perspective. The culmination of this analysis is the introduction of what I 
term “necroeconomics,” or the transmogrification of life into commodity through an 
economically-motivated, speciesist war against otherwise economically valueless 
animal life. This framework will then be applied to the case of the IWC’s moratorium 
on commercial whaling and the ongoing Japanese “scientific” whaling campaign.   
There are three principal implications of the necroeconomic analysis that this 
paper will attempt to bear out. The first is that the roots of speciesism - and the 
attendant mistreatment of animals and use of animals as products in the market – are 
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not solely moral or social constructs, but are rather aspects of the broader, modern 
political economy. This suggests they must be tackled not only at the level of 
individual morality, but at the level of the economic system itself. The second 
implication is that a necroeconomic analysis challenges the implied amorality and 
impartiality of economics and science and reveals the degree of anthropocentric 
politics tied up within both of these. Finally, it presents a new framework for analyzing 
human-animal relations that animals form an integral part of political, economic and 
scientific power matrices 
 
 
 
1. Setting the Stage 
 
 This paper aims to sketch the various aspects of the human-animal relationship 
with a view of explaining how it is that these combine within the political-economic 
system. But before delving into the moral argument about animal rights of the details 
of economic relations with non-humans, let us start by examining the roots of the 
human-animal relationship in modern Western civilization and how this relationship 
was carried over into the founding maxims of the modern capitalist economy.  
1.1. A brief genealogy of speciesism
3
  
There is a long tradition in what might broadly be termed Western thought 
which situates animals in the doubly unfortunate position of being inferior to humans 
                                                 
3 Defined by Peter Singer as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species.” Singer. Animal Liberation. Avon Books, 1990. p.6 This paper will go on to offer an expanded and 
arguably a more complete definition of this term, but Singer’s definition is perfectly apt for the moment. 
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and – because of this or for other reasons which will be discussed below – at humans’ 
disposal. Tracing the genealogy of the human relationship with nonhuman fauna is a 
monolithic task and I am not suggesting that I will undertake such a task. It is, however, 
useful to briefly outline the Judeo-Christian and Aristotelian ideas about this 
relationship – and about the nature of humanity - as these have gone on to directly 
influence the prevalent moral, philosophical, economic, and scientific notions about 
the role of animals in society. This may seem like a generalization, but it is these 
notions which have shaped the bulk of human practice in terms of animal hunting, 
rearing, and consumption; implied the right to use animals for economic ends; and set 
the stage for the exclusion of the consideration of animals as political – and in most 
cases moral – subjects.  
 I do not mean to discount various civilizational, geographical, or temporal 
necessities that led and continue to lead various peoples to use and kill animals for 
their own purposes, but I do agree with the moral philosopher Peter Singer that such 
treatment is often justified or socially embedded through “ideological camouflages” 
and “myth[s] to make human beings feel their supremacy and their power.”4 Looking 
at Aristotelian philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition, as Singer does, gives us a 
very incomplete view of the global human-animal relationship and the myriad 
permutations it takes, but given the influence of these two world-views on modern 
science and economics, such a limited scope is sufficient for our purposes.  
The Bible is explicit about the human-animal relationship. The Book of Genesis 
urges humans to “replenish the earth, and subdue it.” Indeed, the Bible’s god tells 
humanity that “the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the 
earth … Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you …” There are two aspects 
                                                 
4 Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. 1990. p.186, p.2 
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of this religious codex which stand out and continue to this day: the supposed sanctity 
and supremacy of human life over other forms of life, and the social entrenchment of 
the unquestioned right to kill animals.5 Thomas Aquinas introduced the notion of 
hierarchization of species which will be discussed in this paper with his ideal of 
perfection, namely that “more perfect” beings like humans had the natural right to kill 
those less so. He also made the now ubiquitous argument that cruelty to animals 
should be avoided only because it might be indicative of a capacity to mistreat 
humans.  
A very similar conclusion was arrived at through the application of deductive 
reasoning. Aristotle concluded that “[s]ince nature makes nothing purposeless or in 
vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for the sake of man.”6 Animals 
were resources and, as Locke would later argue, it is a human duty to not waste 
resources. 
 It is indicative of the degree to which the notion of human supremacy over 
other animal species is entrenched in our society that the Enlightenment did little but 
reinforce – and in some important ways exacerbate – the lot of nonhuman animals. 
With its focus on discovering natural truths and moving away from theocentreism and 
mythology, it might have been expected – perhaps naively - that the role of nature 
and nonhumans, as they came to be better understood, might  come to play a more 
central role in social and political consideration. But instead the Enlightenment drove 
a wedge between man and nature in theory and practice by introducing a specific and 
anthropocentric approach to understanding the world.  
                                                 
5 Ritual slaughter is also an intrinsic part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Take halal and kosher meat, which is simply ritualistic 
killing enshrined in religious doctrine. 
6 Tellingly, Aristotle – just as Descartes would argue about animals almost two millennia later – considered slaves to be “living 
instruments” rather than people per se.  
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 As explained by Shanin, the movement away from traditional or theocentric 
forms of understanding the world led to one based on a faith in universal, linear 
progress rooted in rationality, “the highest expression of which is science.”7 As Geuss 
notes, there are three central and interconnected properties of Enlightenment 
knowledge: that the objects of knowledge are interchangeable and can be integrated 
into a greater concept of knowledge project; that knowledge is instrumental; and that 
meaning must be related to this instrumental nature of the object of knowledge.8 This 
knowledge as a tool and therefore as an input of the productive process. This 
instrumental knowledge is, as will be reiterated later, a commodity whose value lies in 
the fact that it includes “explicit instructions as to who its beneficiaries are.”9 
Moreover, this knowledge must necessarily be accepted as the totality of definite 
knowledge about nature and humanity. As Schick explains, a “key tenet of 
Enlightenment thinking is its rejection of that beyond what we can see and control.”10 
 Adorno and Horkheimer condemn this epistemology, asserting that the 
“Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men.”11 This places 
nature and the nonhuman realm in a precarious situation. On the one hand, humanity 
separates itself from nature, by, as Latour explains, disavowing ties with it and making 
Nature and Society into two separate spheres. But behind this separation is a constant 
drive to understand this new, separate nature with a view to controlling it and 
harnessing it for human use. It also sets up Nature as an Other to human society, 
making it the twin object of inquest and mistrust as “whatever does not conform to 
                                                 
7 Shanin, Teodor. “The Idea of Progress.” In The Post-Development Reader. Majid Rahnema (ed.). Zed Books, 1997. p.65 
8 Geuss, Raymond. Outside Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. p.164; also cited in Schick, Kate. (“‘To Lend a Voice 
to Suffering is a Condition for All Truth’: Adorno and International Political Thought.” Journal of International Political Theory. 5(2), 
2009.), to whom I owe thanks for the source and line of inquiry. 
9 Adorno, T. Prisms. Quoted in Schick, p. 142. 
10 Schick, 2009. p.145 
11 Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Verso, 1999. p.9 
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the rule of computation and utility is suspect.”12 Nature is given but two options, and 
the possibility of being part of human society or somehow crossing the boundary 
between its sphere and the human one becomes an ontological impossibility. As 
Latour argues, “if nature is not made by of for human beings, then it remains foreign, 
forever remote and hostile, Nature’s very transcendence overwhelms us, or renders it 
inaccessible.”13 Nature must therefore always play a part, remain the recipient of 
projections of social categories, doomed forever to be “ahuman, sometimes inhuman, 
always extrahuman.”14 
A prime example of this belief, and the frequent target of the animal rights 
critique of modern science’s approach to animals, is René Descartes. In a bizarre logic 
chain linking reason, theology, and a mechanistic view of life, Descartes believed that 
although humans and animals were both possessed of machine-like bodies and brains, 
which meant they could feel pain, humans were unique in their ability to think and 
therefore experience God and therefore have a soul and therefore actually experience 
pain.15 Sentience is here separated from cognition, the only proof of which Descartes 
was willing to accept being the uniquely human capacity for reasoned verbal 
communication. This means that, for practical purposes, animals could be treated as 
automata and subjected to practices including poisoning, asphyxiation, and vivisection 
in the name of scientific experimentation.16 
                                                 
12 Ibid. p.6 
13 Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard University Press, 1993. p.30 
14 Ibid. p.80 
15 See Garner (2005), p. 14 and 27; and Guerrini (2002). 
16 Descartes apologists like Guerrini seek to exonerate him through the bizarre tactic of arguing that he never denied animals the 
capacity to feel pain (one of the central lines of argumentation in favour of animal right) but that he simply did not think they 
could experience it and therefore that it was a moot point. Guerrini is also quick to point out that Descartes himself only 
performed a limited number of vivisections. And that, besides, for most scientists who performed vivisection, “the Cartesian 
question doesn’t come up” because they reject all philosophical arguments outright from the scientific arena. See Guerrini, Anita. 
“The Rhetorics of Animal Rights.” In Applied Ethics in Animal Research: Philosophy, Regulation, and Laboratory. Ed. Gluck et al. 
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This brief genealogy shows that speciesism is deeply socially entrenched and 
that the Enlightenment, if anything, exacerbated it by making animals subject to any 
use that could be deemed to further knowledge. And it was precisely this attitude that 
was prevalent at the inception of modern capitalism, which adopted it 
unquestioningly. The following section briefly sketches out the philosophical 
foundation of market capitalism and explains how animals were implicated in it. 
 
1.2. Property, commodities, and animals 
If a worldview based on the principles of the Enlightenment is the 
philosophical foundation of modernity, then the primary social foundation must lie in 
economic interaction. The economic realm, rooted in the ideas of private property 
and of commodities whose value is governed by market value, is not only inherently 
unable to give any special consideration to animals, it cannot differentiate them from 
humans, natural resources, or capital. Animals are a product to be used and 
consumed by the market. Let us briefly examine how such a situation came about.  
 John Locke, in his seminal Second Treatise on Government, linked traditional 
notions of divine right to the “natural right” to private property. He argued that all 
that is in Nature is Man’s, and that if man uses his own labour to “remove”, 
“appropriate”, or “adulterate” anything that is otherwise part of the commons, that 
thing becomes his private property, giving him exclusive right to its use. He suggests 
that anything in Nature which can be improved “for the benefit of life” should be so 
used, suggesting that those potential resources left untapped are wasted by not being 
                                                                                                                                              
Purdue University Press, 2002. Especially pages 58-62. The unquestioned notion that nature and nonhumans exist for human 
manipulation and control moved away from science and appears in the works of thinkers as diverse as Habermas. See Latour 
(1993) p.60. 
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put to human use. Shanin links this mindset to the pre-eminence of rationality in the 
drive to eliminate those things which would be “wasteful of human energies and 
economic resource.”17 In this world view, nothing in nature has an inherent value 
outside the value placed upon it by human actions and needs, and it cannot have such 
value unless it first becomes an individual’s private property.                                                          
Locke is also one of the first modern Western philosophers to make a direct 
link between human superiority over animals and the right to property. In three brief 
passages he lays out the basis for continued human exploitation of animals on land 
and sea, and makes the seminal leap of logic that because animals are natural 
resources, they can be claimed as property. “Natural reason,” he writes, “[…] tells us 
that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to 
meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence.”18 This 
inherently includes animals, but how does one allocate creatures which, unlike land or 
trees or coal, are not static? Locke reasons that “though the earth and all inferior 
creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person.”19 
It is not the animal that matters in this relationship, but the human labour that 
goes into taming, domesticating, or killing it. Locke is explicit on this point, writing that 
“…what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of 
mankind … made his property who takes that pains about it … whoever has employed 
so much labour about any of that kind as to find and pursue her has thereby removed 
her from the state of Nature wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.”20 
The example of fish is telling as, unlike for instance cows or oxen, fish and other 
                                                 
17 Shanin. p.65 
18 Locke, John. Second Treatise on Government; chapter V; passage 24. Accessed through Project Gutenberg at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/7370. Accessed on Jan 3, 2010. 
19 Ibid. Chapter V; passage 26. 
20 Ibid. Chapter V; passage 29. 
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oceans dwellers cannot be used for labour or by-products like milk. Their utility to 
mankind is strictly as food or products made from their carcasses.21 Locke, therefore, 
enshrines in natural law the notion that in death an animal can become property and 
that the justification for this ownership lies strictly in the “labour” involved in 
removing the creature from the “state of Nature.” In this inescapable, strictly amoral 
logic circuit, killing justifies property, which justifies killing. 
Coinciding with the maturation of Enlightenment thought and the emergence 
of disciplinary and biopower in the Foucauldian narrative (see Section 3), the 
nineteenth century saw the emergence in Britain of a distinctly new form of the 
capitalist mode of production.  
This development is discussed most clearly in the work of Karl Polanyi.22 The 
crux of Polanyi’s argument is that the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the various 
socio-political factors surrounding its emergence set into motion a process whereby 
social relationships became predicated upon the dictates of the market.23 The basis 
for Polanyi’s analysis is his assertion that “for industrial society to work, all factors of 
production must be for sale in needed quantities for anyone able to pay.”24 This 
implies the emergence of what Polanyi terms the three “fictitious commodities”: land, 
labour, and capital. These are fictitious because rather than being commodities in the 
                                                 
21 With the obvious exception of animals captured for zoos, performance, etc. 
22 It is beyond the scope of this work to trace Polanyi’s genealogy of the emergence of the market system. But it bears noting 
that Polanyi’s assertions about historical market and social relations have been heavily scrutinized from certain quarters (See, for 
instance, Hejeebu, Santhi and McCloskey, Deirdre. “The Reproving of Karl Polanyi.” Critical Review, Vol. 13, No. 3/4, Summer 
1999. pp. 285-314.) 
23 This notion, and especially the focus on Britain, has also been the focus of vigorous and inter-disciplinary academic debate, but 
a relative consensus seems to have emerged that the specific form of purely market-based capitalism described by Polanyi was 
indeed a historically and geographically specific event. As noted by Comninel, “the evidence would suggest that capitalism is truly 
extraordinary - a unique development of English society. Yet … its internal relationships allowed it to – after, and as a result of, 
the Industrial Revolution – take root in any society that had private property, contract, trade, and other so-called ‘bourgeois’ 
social relationships.” Comninel, George C. ‘English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism’, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 27, 
No. 4, 2000. p.43. 
24 Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. p.43 
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strict sense of being goods produced for sale, they are instead the very inputs 
necessary for production to occur.25 They are also the foundations of society, as they 
make up populace, the totality of natural resources, and the means of exchange. This 
leads to a social transformation whereby instead of the economy being embedded in 
social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system.26 This 
transformation was great indeed: 
“Henceforth, as Adam Smith was later able to explain, the needs of 
social existence could be met through production that responded 
solely to the market. It would not, however, be the same 
production, the same needs, or the same social existence. 
Capitalism was the full systematization of these new social 
relations of production.”27  
In other words, society – including interpersonal relationship and relationships 
between humans and their natural surroundings – are shaped in such a way as to 
allow the market system to function according to its own laws. In a perverse 
expansion of Enlightenment ideals, everything becomes instrumental to the creation 
of value. Adorno and Horkheimer observe that the emergence of the market was 
paradoxically “both the actual form of reason and the power which destroyed 
reason.”28 As Schick notes, after Marx, in such a system, “categories such as beauty 
and social worth become null and void, and things in themselves, including human 
                                                 
25 Polanyi’s thesis goes beyond – and to some extent challenges – Marx’s notion of exchange value, whereby commodities in the 
capitalist system are stripped of intrinsic value in favour of market value in that it introduces the concept of fictitious 
commodities and, through Polanyi’s theory of the double movement, suggests the possibility of opposition to commodification 
and its devaluation of intrinsic value within the capitalist system. See Marx (1990) and Polanyi (2001).  
26 Polanyi. p.60 
27 Comninel. p.47 
28 Adorno and Horkheimer. p.90 
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beings and the natural world, lose their inherent value.”29 The value-based 
relationship between humans and the environment is especially problematic because 
“the economic function is but one of many vital functions of land.”30 The implication 
here, albeit not one directly stated by Polanyi, is that the capitalist economic 
arrangement is inherently anthropocentric in that, in the tradition of Locke, it sees 
natural resources’ sole role as that of property or potential property for human 
exploitation.  
While Polanyi does not discuss animals directly, we can make two guesses as 
to where they would be situated: either they would be included in the same rubric as 
land, being a part of nature and yet not a commodity in the traditional sense, or they 
would indeed be considered an actual commodity. The former seems simplistic and 
inadequate while the latter seems unlikely and indeed impossible considering 
Polanyi’s specific assault on the “fictitious” nature of the other commodities he 
discusses. It is, of course, entirely possible that Polanyi did not consider this question 
at all. I would suggest that animals must be disambiguated from land and be 
considered as an especially problematic, fourth fictitious commodity. By more 
problematic I do not mean more important but rather more complex. This is because, 
in simplest terms, an animal is not a rock. There are numerous characteristics which 
distinguish animals from static natural resources, including mobility, sentiency (and 
related notions like interests which will be discussed throughout Section 2) and their 
own, non-economic relations with the land. This distinction is an important one in that 
animals tend to be conflated with other natural resources in terms of use and 
                                                 
29 Schick. P.143 
30 Polanyi. p.187 
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possession within the economic sphere, which in turn presents a great challenge to 
the debate about animal rights. 
The disambiguation being completed, however, paints an even grimmer 
picture of the effects of modern economic relations than that posited by Polanyi. The 
“self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia,” he wrote, “such an institution could not 
exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of 
society.”31 If we consider the breadth of nonhuman life directly impacted, however, 
we recognize that the market entails not only human society in its various 
imbrications, but indeed the subjugation of the entire nonhuman biosphere to the 
laws of the market. Such an expansion, however, seems to confirm Latour’s 
conclusion that by “seeking to reorient man’s exploitation of man toward an 
exploitation of nature by man, capitalism magnified both beyond measure.”32 
This section has shown that the animal-human relationship established in 
traditional thought and continued through the Enlightenment’s focus on rationality 
was carried on the establishment of an economic system where animals were 
considered to be simply another commodity. Through this process, animals became 
entirely instrumentalised: deemed inferior to humans and in fact insurmountably 
Other to them, they became legitimate victims for individual use, scientific exploration, 
and economic gain. But this position did not go unchallenged. 
 
1.3. An enlightened defense? 
 
  The subservient and disposable role of animals vis-a-vis humans within the 
modern triumvirate of traditional beliefs, Enlightenment thinking, and capitalism 
                                                 
31 Ibid. p.3 
32 Latour (1993). p.8 
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seems inescapable. This is especially true if considered along the lines of reasoning 
offered by any of the three individually.  
An animal cannot deserve preferential treatment if it is ordained by a higher 
power that it is to be used by man at his leisure and to suit his own needs. But what if 
there is no God, no natural law? An animal is a part of nature, which serves as an 
Other to humans and human society. It is there to be understood and used to further 
human knowledge and the needs of human society. But how can it be used in the 
market if it has no inherent value? As a natural resource it does have inherent value 
dictated by the forces of supply and demand and must be available to be used and 
disposed of based on these dictates.  
How can one argue against animals’ inferiority in the face of their relegation to 
a subject of instrumental knowledge deployed in using them for the market and 
maximizing their value therein? The best effort to so in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment has been the effort to suggest either that animals have inherent rights 
and are therefore due specific treatment or that, rights aside, they have properties 
which warrant more consideration than they currently receive. Indeed, most of the 
efforts to improve the lot of animals for the past two centuries has revolved around 
this rational-moral mode of argument. This debate is explored in the next section.  
 
2. The animal rights debate 
 
Peter Singer encapsulates the relationship between the world’s species as the 
“tyranny of human over nonhuman animals.”33 At the heart of the voluminous animal 
rights literature is the belief that humans treat nonhuman animals in an unacceptable 
                                                 
33 Singer (1990) p.2.  
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manner and, for the most part, that this treatment should be ameliorated.34 To 
address this, the literature seeks to ascertain - in myriad ways - what characteristics 
animals possess that would make them deserving of this better treatment and, to a 
lesser extent, what flaws or inconsistencies in human thought or social construction 
need to be altered so that animals are treated more justly. 
The purpose of advocates of animal rights is to establish that at some level 
animals have some inherent properties than mean they merit a certain treatment. The 
notion of what this treatment is varies between authors and between different 
approaches, but the common belief that animal rights are directly subjugated to 
human interests. In other words, humans, because of either notions of human rights 
to treat animals in certain ways or due to economic, scientific or cultural concerns, 
subject animals to treatment – including death – which violates their rights. The basis 
for this treatment is speciesism. 
This section will delve into the various philosophical approaches to the animal 
rights question, including critiques of each from both within and outside the animal 
rights movement, and will also address the criticism that the very notion of animal 
possessing rights is a philosophically untenable one.  
The first part of this discussion is divided into similar categories to those used 
by Robert Garner (principally 2005, but also in his other work), but in most cases uses 
different or complimentary sources to those used by Garner. This section will also 
                                                 
34 As many others have pointed out, applying the term “animal rights” to this far broader debate, many of whose principal 
players reject the notion of rights per se, is misleading if not disingenuous. It is only in part a debate about whether or not 
animals posses rights in a universal sense, and much more a debate about how animals should be treated and why. It is also 
increasingly, as will be discussed later in this paper, a debate about how animals might be included within political theory or 
represented or even brought into actual politics. The terms “animal politics” or “nonhuman political theory”, though far from 
optimal, are perhaps more apt (although even these might exclude certain notions about immanence and human-nonhuman 
politics). Due to the potential for making a bigger mess out of a familiar one, I will use the term “animal rights debate” to 
designate the totality of this field of inquiry. But I do so recognizing all its shortcomings and adding my voice to those calling for a 
better label(s).  
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argue that this debate is indispensable for understanding the human-animal 
relationship and suggest which aspects of this debate are applicable to an analysis of 
the role of animals from a political economy perspective. It will also reject a number 
of criticisms of animal rights as philosophically or empirically untenable. But I will 
conclude that ultimately this debate is inadequate to address the systemically 
entrenched nature of the modern human-animal relationship. 
 
2.1. What is an animal? Interests, personhood, value, equality 
 Why do humans hold a monopoly over personhood? Why is it that the word 
“person” is an identity and a concept which applies exclusively – and, in theory, 
equally - to members of the human race? This line of inquiry is at the heart of the pro-
animal rights argument. Its proponents hold that if the definition of personhood was 
to be expanded to nonhuman animals, then at least some of the duties and rights 
associated with human personhood would have to apply to them as well. 
 If we move past the untenable Cartesian theory that animals are little more 
than automata, where might we set a minimal baseline quality which would require 
some modicum of consideration for their interests? Many argue that this should be 
predicated on the ability to feel pain (and that by extension sentiency should be the 
defining the criterion for morally sound treatment). This position is frequently traced 
back to the early utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham. His opinion, often cited in 
fragments, bears being quoted in full. Besides introducing the capacity to feel pain as 
the principal moral criterion for animal treatment, it prefigures many ongoing aspects 
of the animal rights debate. In his 1789 work Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, Bentham wrote: 
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“Under the Gentoo and Mahometan religions, the interests of the 
rest of the animal creation seem to have met with some attention. 
Why have they not universally, with as much as those of human 
creatures, allowance made for the difference in point of sensibility? 
Because the laws that are have been the work of mutual fear; a 
sentiment which the less rational animals have not had the same 
means as man has of turning to account. Why ought they not? No 
reason can be given. If the being eaten were all, there is very good 
reason why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to 
eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They 
have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery 
which we have. The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, 
and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful 
one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of 
nature. If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why 
we should be suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the 
worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. 
But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment 
them? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be 
suffered to torment them? Yes, several. … The day has been, I 
grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater 
part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been 
treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for 
example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, 
when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
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which never could have been withholden from them but by the 
hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the 
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be 
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may 
come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the 
villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are 
reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the 
same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is 
it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a 
full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as 
well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a 
week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, 
what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can 
they talk? but, Can they suffer?”35  
 This argument, however, did not result in a universal injunction against causing 
suffering to animals either in Bentham’s broader school of thought or in that of the 
many scholars who have grappled with this problem since. Some do argue that we 
should strive to cause animals no pain whatsoever; this seemingly simple argument, 
however, raises many new questions about what exactly constitutes pain.36 This paper 
cannot delve too deep into this question, but two related points bear noting. The first 
is that, as noted by Ralph Mitchell, within the evolution of animal life, the role of pain 
is to evoke reactions to alleviate the pain and its causes and develop pain avoidance 
                                                 
35 Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 1789 "Limits between Private Ethics and the Art 
of Legislation," § 1, ¶4 Footnote. My emphasis. 
36 Various authors suggest that the definitions of “pain” and “suffering” should move beyond physical pain and the threat of 
imminent death to events and actions as diverse as isolation, forced mating, shearing, milking, ecosystem pollution and 
destruction, introduction of non-native species into existing biospheres, etc. 
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strategies. As such, considering the difference in lifestyle between animals and most 
modern humans, it is very plausible that the pain (and especially the immediate 
physical pain) experienced by animals, being central to the survival mechanism, is 
more acute in animals than it is in humans.37 Moreover, as pertains to the notion of 
animal cruelty, Midgley argues that “the only plausible account of why cruelty is a vice 
acknowledges the moral status of its victim.”38 In other words, if one acknowledges 
that cruelty is the cause of pain, then one must recognize that the ability to feel pain is 
sufficient to establish moral consideration. 
Others, however, either reject this view outright or suggest that if suffering 
defined as physical pain is the only litmus test for sound moral treatment, then 
practices like “humane killing” should suffice to keep humans in the moral clear. This 
remains in many cases the mainstream view, propagated even by “pro-animal” groups 
like the SPCA and various governmental Animal Ethics committees.  
The debate becomes even more contentious and convoluted when it comes to 
the debate between those who seek to dismiss suffering as insufficient for moral 
agency and those who seek to grant nonhumans more of the characteristics of 
personhood. Sunstein and Nussbaum, for instance, contend that using the ability to 
suffer as the only criterion for being privy to rights is not entirely sound because 
animals are not "moral agents" in the same sense as humans in that they are 
incapable of following moral dictates themselves. In other words, do humans owe 
something to animals that animals are incapable of understanding or reciprocating?39  
                                                 
37 Rollin, Bernard . “Scientific Ideology, Anthropomorphism, Anecdote, and Ethics.” New Ideas in Psychology. 18 (1), 2000. pp. 
110. 
38 Midgley, Mary. “Persons and Non-Persons.” In Peter Singer (ed), In Defense of Animals. Basil Blackwell, 1985, p.42 
39 Sunstein, Cass and Nussbaum, Martha. Animal Rights: Current debates and new    directions. Oxford University Press, 2005.  
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For others, the criterion of suffering is insufficient to establish personhood. 
Kant, for instance, suggested that personhood required the ability to understand and 
compose signs (although modern semiotics and concepts of communication via 
semiospheres – see Section 3.8 below – might prove that many animals safely satisfy 
this criterion). Other posit the notion of being able to develop a long-term life plan 
that exceeds basic short-term survival consideration (but this too is being challenged 
by work with primates). DeGrazia does not deny that animals suffer, but suggests that 
personhood requires the ability for a higher order (as opposed, presumably, to 
severity) of suffering. He suggests that humans have specific attributes based on our 
intelligence and self-awareness that can create forms of suffering distinct from that of 
animals. This “existential” suffering includes feelings such as anguish or concern about 
one’s own or others’ potential futures, which might be made impossible through 
death.41  
In a perfect example of modern, objective classification, Evelyn Pluhar has 
created a hierarchy of types of persons, ranging from “full-fledged persons” through 
“persons lower on the autonomy scale” to “natural objects or systems.”42 As the basis 
for the creation of the various categories is inescapably based on human cognitive and 
social processes, the categories themselves cannot help but be anthropocentric. As 
such, Pluhar’s conclusion comes as no surprise: that since no animals can match 
human mental complexity, only humans are full-fledged persons.  
On the other end of the spectrum, many in the animal rights camp argue that 
hierarchization based on some set of criteria has no bearing on moral standing and 
                                                 
41 DeGrazia, David. “Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status.” In The Animal Ethics Reader. Ed. Susan Armstrong and 
Richard Botzler. London: Routledge, 2003. p. 54 
42 Pluhar, Evelyn. Beyond prejudice: the moral significance of human and nonhuman animals. Duke, 1995. p.57 
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that sentiency is in an of itself a sufficient condition for moral standing.43 Midgley goes 
further in putting forward the notion that not only does the ability to suffer per se 
qualify animals as persons but that animals should be entitled to specific 
consideration due to their “emotional fellowship” with humans.44  
As this summary has shown, the animal rights debate is a rich and contentious 
one. However, in and of itself, the various arguments fail to provide either an 
analytical framework or a guide for action (note that even Bentham stops short of 
prohibiting causing suffering to animals). The debate itself is a massive step forward 
toward ameliorating the lot of animals, but thus far it is inadequate. There are, 
however, two more complex arguments which seek to simultaneously situate moral 
standing within a rational framework and bring the moral standing (or at least 
consideration for it) of humans and nonhumans onto the same logical plane. These 
are the so-called argument from marginal cases and the case for equal consideration 
of interests. 
 
2.1.1. The argument from marginal cases 
The back-and-forth in the personhood debate has led some to suggest that 
rather than limiting itself solely to animals, criteria for personhood should be set for 
all beings including humans. The obvious outcome is that some humans – most 
notably young children and the mentally handicapped – are unable meet certain, even 
basic, criteria for “personhood.” This critique, which complicates both the animal 
                                                 
43 See for instance Taylor, Paul. Respect for Nature: A theory of environmental Ethics. Princeton University Press, 1986. p.295 
44 Midgley. p.58  
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rights debate and broader notions of the sanctity of human life is known as the 
argument from marginal cases.  
This argument can be approached from different angles, be it from 
requirements for ability to suffer, to plan, to communicate, or from the ability to 
uphold moral duties or contracts. These are among the factors combined in John 
Rawls’ seminal notion of “justice as fairness.” Rawls’ argument that a universal theory 
of justice can be arrived at by actors in the “original position” behind a “veil of 
ignorance” – unaware of their position in society or their share of the distribution of 
wealth, yet wholly capable of making rational decisions about fair treatment – is very 
influential in social theory.45 Without delving deeper into this theory or the body of 
general criticisms which addresses it, let us focus on the problem of who can form, 
and by extension be privy to, a theory of justice, and who is excluded from 
participation and benefits.  
Robert Garner, as part of his larger body of work attempting to consider the 
place of animals and animal rights in existing social and political theory, argues for the 
inclusion of the considerations of the interest of animals within Rawls' original 
position. Rawls argues that an individual in the original position needed to have some 
sense of justice. This position seemed to discount the rights of "marginal humans," 
such as for instance young children or mentally disabled adults who would be unable 
to form such a concept independently or grasp it. Rawls does recognize this 
counterargument and argues that "capacity for a sense of justice" is not necessary for 
an actor to be "owed the duties of justice." While Garner acknowledges that children 
might have the potential to develop a sense of justice, this type of future 
                                                 
 45 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Belknep Harvard, 1999. 
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consideration is beyond the scope of the original position; moreover, the mentally 
disabled have no such potential. According to Rawls, animals themselves are not 
necessarily covered by his principles of justice and can be to some extent exploited 
(eaten, experimented upon, etc.). As such, Garner poses the question whether we 
should not therefore have the right to exploit "marginal humans" who do not have a 
developed sense of justice. Two options present themselves, both absolute: yes 
(meaning marginal adults are not privy to justice and can be exploited, experimented 
upon, eaten, and so on) or no (meaning animals have the same rights as marginal 
humans, who have the same right as other humans, and all are therefore privy to 
justice to the extent that it applies to them; animals obviously can't hold political 
office, for example, but their right to life and so on should be respected). Garner's 
primary argument, then, is that "full-personhood" should not be a prerequisite for 
moral consideration.46  
The importance of this argument for our purposes is that it undermines 
anthropocentric rationality by applying the same rational-moral considerations to 
both humans and non-humans. This, in turn, opens the door for both to be examined 
through other, similar analytical frameworks. Now let us move on to a theory which 
suggests how applying similar principles to animals and humans can lead to a common 
basis for treatment regardless of species. 
 
                                                 
46 Garner (2005). This argument echoes the claim by Singer that “If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle 
one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose.” 
(Singer 1990 p.6) 
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2.1.2. Equal consideration of interests 
Peter Singer accepts the notion of animal pain as the basis for consideration, 
but goes on to seek to dispel the idea that moral considerations are tantamount to 
emotional ones or that they necessarily need to be based in abstract theories. While 
acknowledging that “equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact,” he argues that 
the application of equal moral principles to humans and nonhumans is called for by 
reason, not emotion.47 Once arrived at by rational reasoning, he sees equality of moral 
consideration as a normative guide for action. He is also quick to point out that 
suggesting equal treatment for all animals and humans is not tenable due to 
difference in interests, life requirements, mental and physical capacity, and so on. As 
such, he bases his notion of equality not on identical treatment but on what he terms 
“equal consideration” of interests.48 This position holds that if a human and animal 
have comparable interests, these interests should be seen as having equal moral 
importance, with no automatic discount just because one of the beings is not 
human.”49,50 The proponents of this – broadly speaking – universalist approach 
suggest that once interests rather than belonging to a particular species become the 
focus, what emerges is the potential for “moral equality across the species 
boundary.”51 
There is, however, a group within the animal rights camp which takes a 
radically different approach. They suggest that it is possible to simultaneously accept 
                                                 
47 Singer (1990). p.4 
48 Ibid p.2. Singer also challenges an acceptance of equality among humans as either fact or starting point for approaching the 
inter-species equality he advocates. He writes that the “principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an 
alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.” 
49 Singer, Peter. “Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement.” In Peter Singer (ed), In Defense of Animals. New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985. p.9 
50 Garner (2005) and DeGrazia (2003) 
51 Garner (2005). p.19 
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that animals have no moral standing, but that this “does not mean they have no 
value” and “is distinct from the question whether animals matter.”52 Sapontzis 
expands on this idea by arguing that overcoming speciesism “requires recognizing not 
only that the origin of value does not lie in anything that is peculiarly human; it also 
requires recognizing that the origin of value does not lie in anything that is human-like 
or that humans may be assured they have the most of.”53 Interestingly, a similar 
argument is made by DeGrazia, an opponent of notions of animal equality. He 
contends that if we are to attempt to make cross-species comparisons of rights and 
duties to individuals who differ drastically, such a comparison “probably requires the 
attribution of objective, intrinsic value to them.”54 
It could be argued, however, that these two are not so different after all in that 
they both suggest that there should be a basis for a cross-species consideration of 
duties. I will return to this point, but it is important to bear in mind that any theories 
which suggest such an approach – and especially Singer’s which suggests that humans 
and animals can share interests which merit identical consideration – provide a 
potential bridge across the human-nonhuman divide whose permanence is otherwise 
enshrined in modern social and economic theory and practice. 
 For now, however, let us examine how, given this disparity in the philosophical 
foundations for potential changes in human treatment of animals, different animal 
rights advocates suggest nonhumans be treated. 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. P.37 
53 Sapontzis, Steve F. “Aping Persons — Pro and Con.” In The Great Ape Project. Ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. New York: 
St. Martin's Griffin, 1993. p. 271 
54 DeGrazia, David. “Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status.” In The Animal Ethics Reader. Ed. Susan Armstrong and 
Richard Botzler. London: Routledge, 2003. p.55  
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2.2. How should animals be treated?  
It is slightly ironic that the deontological theory of according set rights to 
animals is in fact not the primary focus of the animal rights debate.55 The first obvious 
critique of some universal set of rights granted to animals is that any such list would 
necessarily be anthropocentric in that it would be based on human notions of rights 
and humans upholding those rights in animals’ names. Much of the critique of the 
notion of animal rights follows the same structure and arguments as the broader 
debate over human rights, so I will not delve into it here (see Garner 2005 for a 
detailed outline of this debate). The notion of rights itself being highly contentious 
and problematic, it does not seem like a plausible basis on which to base tangible 
treatment of animals. That being said, a related notion with a relatively 
commonsensical solution bears noting. 
Tom Regan argues that equality is based on the inherent value each living 
being has, which is independent of any specific traits or capabilities other than 
sentience. By virtue of being “the experiencing subject of a life” with “an individual 
welfare” humans and nonhumans alike have equal inherent value.56 Death, then, 
regardless of the reason why it was caused, forecloses the ability, central to being a 
subject-of-a-life, of pursuing the possibility of finding satisfaction in life.57 From this 
definition, we might suggest that humans and nonhumans alike have the right to life 
and, by extension, the right to not be killed and thereby denied satisfaction. 
                                                 
55 See footnote 29. 
56 Regan, Tom. “The Case for Animal Rights.” In Peter Singer (ed), In Defense of Animals. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. p.22-23 
57 Such satisfaction, to avoid anthropomorphism, is considered to be inherent and without any specific criteria for gauging its 
existence or validity. Some, like Bruno Latour, might argue that rather than satisfaction, the criterion might be simply the ability 
to procreate. 
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 To sidestep or discount rights as a basis for the treatment of animals is by no 
means to deny animals moral consideration. Indeed, one of the best known theories 
which seek to incorporate consideration for nonhumans into individual human 
practice is based specifically on the theory that animals are due equal moral 
consideration to humans. That theory is utilitarianism, often traced back to Jeremy 
Bentham, and today most vocally advocated in the realm of animal politics by Peter 
Singer. Singer, as noted above, argues that we are to consider animal and human 
interests – where they are comparable – equally. Primarily this comes down to 
suggesting that animals, like humans, have an inherent interest in not suffering or 
dying and therefore should not be caused to suffer or killed.  
 There are, however, a number of criticisms of utilitarianism which challenge 
just how equal is the consideration it actually provides to animals. Utilitarianism is a 
teleological theory based upon the goal of achieving the greatest aggregate good for 
the majority of stakeholders. As such, it requires attributing specific value to different 
actors and their interests to, for all intents and purposes, mathematically arrive at an 
optimal solution. This approach has two implications: it allows for the sacrifice of 
individuals’ interests (and in this case of individual animals) in the name of aggregate 
benefit and requires that such a sacrifice be depoliticized (as it is a natural part of the 
system).  
Considering that it is humans who set the value and theoretically make up the 
moral majority in this relationship, utilitarianism also opens itself to potential charges 
of anthropocentrism. As Garner notes, “the pain suffered by animals … is disregarded 
if humans can benefit from it, and yet the idea of inflicting pain on humans for the 
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benefit of animals is never entertained.”58 It should be noted that the latter is 
especially the case within the working of modern science and the market system, 
which naturally call for animal suffering and death in the “natural” process of value 
creation while – arguably – not requiring such sacrifice from humans. 
 A slightly different argument is sketched out by the libertarian philosopher 
Robert Nozick, who questions on what grounds humans deem it worthy to use 
animals for their own ends. He argues, for instance, that if eating animals is not 
necessary to a complete or healthy diet and if non-animal alternatives can be used 
without sacrificing health, then there should be no reason to continue to eat animals. 
The fact that people do, then, means that the sole gain they have is a gustatory one: 
people eat animals not because they have to but because doing so gives them 
pleasure. In other words, they implicitly acknowledge that the marginal enjoyment 
they gain by eating meat outweighs animals' lives and suffering. In other words, in 
another critique of the utilitarian calculus, pleasure outweighs moral weight. The 
animal, or more precisely the flesh of a dead animal, is simply instrumental in the 
attainment of human pleasure.  
 And yet, because humans acknowledge that animals are not mere objects (i.e. 
there is some limited moral consideration due them), what emerges is what Nozick 
terms "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”. This means that of animals, 
nonhuman animals may be sacrificed to serve some notion of a greater – not 
necessarily human - good, but humans cannot be sacrificed. As noted by Sunstein and 
Nussbaum, Nozick’s position is not a “plea for moral parity” in that it acknowledges 
implicit differences between humans animals.59 Nozick overcomes the seeming 
                                                 
58 Garner (2005). p.72 
59 Sunstein and Nussbaum. 
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contradiction between his two approaches by stressing that there would have to be a 
valid argument (i.e. not simply wanting to eat animals or randomly test products on 
them) that would constitute a logically consistent action, rather than simply a 
mathematically sound one providing the greatest good for the greatest number. He 
suggests that it is difficult to prove that animals have any specific value, but notes also 
that “it is also difficult to prove that people count for something.”60 Francione 
suggests, however, that since one of the central aspects of Nozick’s broader theory is 
the right to private property, "it is difficult to see how Nozick's principle can lead to 
the humane treatment of animals as long as animals are viewed as private property 
and private property rights are viewed as central to our moral and legal structure."61  
 Let us return briefly to the contractarian notion of social interaction and justice 
espoused by thinker like Rawls. While Rawls’ actual notion of the veil of ignorance and 
moral agency has been discussed above and proven to be incompatible with animals 
(in that they are excluded from decision making in the original position and therefore 
from being considered for just treatment), there are those who suggest that 
contractatianism should not be altogether discounted as a basis for human-animal 
interaction. As Garner suggests, “[a]ll that is required for this to be possible is a 
‘thickening’ of the veil of ignorance so that the participants do not know whether they 
are going to be marginal humans or even whether they are going to be members of 
the human species at all.”62  
 These philosophical arguments, however, remain generally in the realm of 
philosophy as the actual treatment of animals differs dramatically between countries, 
                                                 
60 Nozick, Robert. “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” Basic Books, 1974. p.35-36 
61 Francione, G. Animals, Property, and the Law. Temple University Press, 1995. p.106 
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organizations, species, and across myriad other divides. The thrust of this paper is an 
analysis of the scientific-economic treatment of animals as commodities, but some 
broader areas of human-animal interaction (and their rationale) bear mentioning. 
 
2.3. Addressing animal rights in practice 
Considering the divergences in the rationale for and approaches to the 
treatment of animals in the debate discussed above, it is not surprising that there is 
no consensus in favour of a single “animal rights” agenda. This section briefly 
examines the various proposed solutions. It is also important to note that many 
advocates of the various solutions described above tie them to broader human 
concerns or to overall human moral progress.63   
One of the primary arguments against animal cruelty – both historically and 
among many modern proponents of animal rights – is that mistreatment of animals 
can be either a conduit to or be representative of the propensity to abuse humans.64 
There is also a prevalent argument among feminist-animal-rights theorists that 
mistreatment and consumption of animals can be equated with propensity for the 
abuse and/or subjectification of women.65 As such, animal cruelty should be mitigated 
socially and legally and much animal use should be diminished or carried out in a 
“humane” manner. This moral-cum-anthropocentric view is extended, insufficiently in 
my view, by a few authors from tangible abuse to broader socio-economic 
                                                 
63 Peter Singer (1985) writes that the animal liberation struggle “marks an expansion of our moral horizons beyond our own 
species and is thus a significant stage in the development of human ethics.” Regan (“The case for…” 1985) underscores that “the 
animal rights movement is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights movement.” 
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relationships. Rowlands, for instance, suggests that it “is impossible to view the world 
and everything in it primarily as a resource without this infecting the way we view 
each other.”66 The question, though, is whether the particular relationship of 
commodification is indeed transferred from human-animal to human-human relations 
or vice versa or, indeed, whether from an economic perspective it is simultaneous and 
indistinguishable. 
 The second argument presented throughout the animal rights literature 
revolves around the oft-quoted rallying cry that “Meat is murder.” The crux of the 
argument is that depriving any creature, human or nonhuman, of the right to live is 
the gravest violation of their rights. Vegetarianism and/or veganism are presented as 
ways in which individuals, by regulating their own behaviour, can impact behaviour 
which is harmful to animals. Indeed, dietary choice is the crux of the arguments of 
thinkers as diverse as Singer, Francione, and Schleifer. Schleifer also argues that 
vegetarianism would help the world’s most needy human population by freeing up 
resources from livestock to grain and vegetable cultivation.67 She also takes issue with 
those who argue the merits of humane slaughter and other “animal-friendly” methods 
of meat rearing and consumption. She argues that such lines of argumentation 
“sugges[t] that the taking of life is not the problem [and] to make matters worse … 
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ignor[e] the fact that the specific moment of death is only a fraction of a larger 
process.”68 
 The third solution - and attendant debate – involves conservation or 
preservation or individual animals, species, or ecosystems. The central dichotomy 
here is between proponents of conservation (protection for future human use or 
enjoyment) or preservation (in effect protection for nature’s own sake). There is 
further tension introduced between those who support the conservation or 
preservation of specific species (which itself draws criticism of anthropocentrism or 
intellegencism) and holistic preservationists who take the ecocentric view and call for 
protection of entire ecosystems rather than protection which is fauna- or species-
specific.  
Here we see in practice the difference between a utilitarian approach, 
evidenced in the conservation notion of human benefit, and an inherent-value-based 
approach which excludes direct human benefit (aside from “feeling good” about 
protecting ecosystems or species). The dominant paradigm is conservation, with the 
attendant problem that it is “macro” in nature. As Garner notes, this means that the 
goal is “protection of species or ecosystems and not the protection and well-being of 
individual animals. It is therefore permissible in the case of a holistic conservation 
ethic to sacrifice the interests of individual animals if by doing so the integrity of a 
species or ecosystem is maintained.”69 This brings up the question of whether it is, for 
instance, valid to kill a certain number of animals to sell in order to fund further 
conservation or to study them to ascertain how many can be “sustainably killed.” The 
alternative viewpoint, espoused by Regan, is that “[b]eing neither the accountants nor 
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managers of felicity in nature, wildlife managers should be principally concerned with 
letting animals be, keeping human predators out of their affairs, allowing these ‘other 
nations’ to carve out their own destiny.”70 This is because animals are subjects-of-a-
life whose value should not be, on an individual or species level, be entered into a 
calculus to determine aggregate utility. 
Again, within the proposed solutions to the ongoing undesirable treatment of 
animals, we see vast divergence in opinion and rationale, and a large degree of –
perhaps inevitable – anthropocentrism. And the entire body of pro-animal rights 
theory has its own critics who seek to discredit either its philosophical bases or the 
actions it suggests. 
 
2.4. The critics  
 The positions taken by the critics are as varied as those raised by the various 
proponents of animal rights. These range from challenges to the philosophical 
foundations of the various ideas discussed above, through restatements of the 
traditional anthropocentric positions critiqued by the animal rights movement, to 
criticisms of the proposed solutions to animal rights abuses and speciesism. This 
section cannot claim to do justice to either the breadth or depth of this large body of 
critical comment, but it will seek to address the principal points of contention and, 
where possible, present the rebuttals from the animal rights camp. 
 The primary philosophical challenge to the animal rights argument is the 
broader, ongoing debate about the validity of moral arguments. Representative of this 
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critique are statements such as Thomas’ that moral statements are “nothing but 
expressions and attempted elicitations of emotion” which are “incapable of truth and 
cannot embody knowledge.”71 Others, like Garner, note that there is also an inherent 
problem with relying on notions of natural rights or rights-based obligations. He 
argues that it is difficult to defend an ontology based on inherent universal absolutes 
like rights in a world – and on an intellectual landscape – where the theocentric view 
carries less force.72 Benton takes a similar stance but directly critiques the application 
of right to animals. He argues that “given the diversity of moral dilemmas posed by 
our relations to animals, it seems … unlikely that the single philosophical strategy of 
assigning universal rights of a very abstract kind to them would be a sufficient 
response.”73 
 Another body of thought challenges the philosophical basis for arguments that 
would seek to undermine the primacy of the human race in the biological hierarchy. 
Most of this addresses the various aspects of the personhood debate and seek to 
highlight defining aspects of humanity which disqualify nonhumans from qualification 
for full personhood and therefore from increased consideration vis-a-vis humans. A 
central argument of this contingent is that rationality is a necessary attribute for the 
development of thoughts and feelings (which in turn are central to full personhood) 
but that rationality can only be evaluated on the basis of the ability to form rational 
arguments in speech.74 Some, like Frey, go so far as to argue that the inability to 
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articulate desires through language discounts the possibility of the existence of 
desires.75  
Carruthers takes a slightly different tack and argues, echoing Rawls, that moral 
agency is based on the agent’s ability to be part of a social contract allocating explicitly 
stated rights and duties.76 This discounts the possibility that animal social organization 
and cultural development is valid as it cannot be proven that these involve a rational 
distribution or even acknowledgement of rights and duties. Another vaguely related 
strain of argument rehashes the quality-of-life argument and suggests that humans, 
by virtue of being able to formulate not only plans but the very notion of a future, 
with attached desires, expectations, and so on, live life on a higher plane than animals 
who are incapable of such formulation or planning. In other words, human primacy 
lies in the fact that humans live life in a “biographical” sense while animals do so only 
in a biological one.77 
 A specific critique of the animal rights narrative seeks to challenge the 
reasoning behind the animal rights debate, primarily as it pertains to those animals 
“closest” to humans. Proponents of this school argue that hierarchization of species 
within some of the animal rights literature (See Pluhar 1995), and primarily the 
preference given to large mammals like cetaceans and elephants in theory and 
practice like conservation and dietary exclusion, is itself anthropocentric. The – 
paradoxically flattering – term “charismatic megafauna” has been used to describe 
creatures which “many people in developed states think of as ‘special creatures’ due 
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to size, intelligence, and other human-like attributes.”78 Epstein argues that the 
predominant notion of endangered species protection might be an “exclusive and 
reductionist paradigm … [n]ot least because not all species qualify.”79  
The argument here is that humans should be less empathetic toward specific 
animals and instead follow one of two paths: a more holistic one based on 
consideration of entire ecological systems or biospheres or, more commonly, a more 
rational and instrumental one based on economic dictates that treat all nonhumans 
equally, namely as resources (Jacobson 2001, Edwards 1994, etc.). A staunch advocate 
of the latter approach, Robert Friedheim suggests that conservation of cetaceans can 
only be explained by an irrational, politically motivated “fear” on the part of Western 
elected officials that “bucking the messages of Free Willy and Flipper will cost them 
votes.”80 
 The fourth branch of the critique of the animal rights movement is aimed at 
their recommendations for incorporating their philosophy into practice. The first such 
argument echoes both Descartes and Locke in suggesting that animals have no value 
in and of themselves and indeed that if they are not exploited they are wasted. This 
idea has frequently been articulated as protest against preservation initiatives and has 
been especially salient in the whaling debate.81  
 A similar but more complex debate surrounds the justification for animal 
experiments. At the intersection of utilitarianism and the broader moral orthodoxy, 
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there is the assumption that even if animals can suffer, that suffering is justifiable if it 
produces human benefit. Implicit here is the notion that animal rights, even if they 
exist, are secondary to human rights and, moreover, that it is a human right to exploit 
animals for human benefit. This argument, however, when presented as a rights issue, 
runs into the same problems as the animal rights argument itself (see above) and, 
moreover, impinges on other iterations of the universal view of human rights held by 
others. Bogle, for instance, argues that “[u]sing human rights as a defense of such an 
industry [animal experimentation] soils the purity of the claim of universal dignity.”82 
Another line of criticisms, taken by scholars like Kathryn Paxton George, while 
skirting the arguments in favour of animal rights or the improved treatment of animals 
themselves, attack the proposed solutions, such as Singer and Schleifer’s emphasis on 
individual action through vegetarianism/veganism. Paxton George argues, for instance, 
that vegetarianism, rather than being a universal ideal, is culturally specific and a 
“norm that is biased against many people living in ethnic, cultural, economic, and 
environmental circumstances unlike those in which the vegan ideal can be successfully 
rationalized.”83 Barsh takes a similar approach in critiquing universal conservation 
initiatives like the IWC moratorium on whaling. He argues that some human 
populations must eat certain animals to survive – a point that itself is debatable on 
both factual grounds and because it implies the primacy of humans by defending their 
right to kill other animals – and that universal restrictions are akin to imperialism. 
Barsh calls this Western “food hegemony” and implies that it sets the standard for 
ecologically and culturally destructive practices while setting norms as to the 
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acceptability of various farming, hunting, and culinary practices and even the very 
“aesthetics of food.”84 
Lumping these criticisms together does not mean they deserve equal 
consideration or that they are all equally convincingly argued. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to address or rebut each of these in detail. However, for the further 
arguments contained herein to be valid, certain aspects of the critique must be 
rejected outright. Principally, the notion that animals cannot suffer or experience said 
suffering is, as has been proven by the preceding sections, neither philosophically nor 
empirically tenable. Animals feel pain and they feel it as individual subjects of their 
own life and their own experience. Second, the debate about levels of personhood 
can be avoided by using Bentham’s notion of suffering as a baseline for consideration 
– the word “person” need not be used, nor is it important per se – and agreeing with 
Singer that the interests that animals do share with humans should have equal 
consideration regardless of species. Both of the above must hold regardless of the 
circumstances – be they economic, scientific, political, or cultural.  
 
2.5. The importance and inadequacy of the animal rights debate 
As the previous sections have shown, the animal rights debate is a rich one 
which profoundly challenges the status quo of human-animal treatment. It also 
influences policy and social opinion about issues as diverse as vegetarianism, animal 
vivisection, and wildlife preservation. However, it is also a moral argument which 
appeals to universal notions of natural rights, to relatively pure rationality, or to the 
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existence of a tangible morality – at the individuals and social level - to which such an 
argument would speak. We may for instance accept, as Rick Bogle claims, that 
“[c]laims that rights are reserved for humans alone is requiring ever more strained 
and artificial argument.”85 But if the very notions of rights or moral duty or even the 
possibility of suggesting that there is a philosophical basis for thinking of animals as 
persons are challenged or outright rejected, it ceases to be valid as a universal model 
for the analysis of human-animal interaction. At most, those who reject them might 
argue against excessive cruelty on the grounds that it might spill over into abuse of 
humans. More importantly, however, even if its claims – be it of rights or of specific 
treatment rooted in utilitarianism or contractarianism – are accepted, the solutions 
are based specifically on individual humans’ duties toward individual animals (with the 
exception of conservation, which will be addressed later in Sections 3.3, 3.8, 4, and 5).  
I am not seeking to downplay the contribution of this school of thought to 
alleviating - or at least shedding light on – the plight of nonhumans. Indeed, this work 
is important in allowing individuals a broad range of opinions on which to draw in 
making a personal choice about how to view nonhumans and how to alter (or not) 
one’s lifestyle accordingly. This in itself is an immense step toward challenging what is 
undoubtedly a speciesist status quo. But this is also the limit of the debate. 
It should be noted that there is a contingent within the animal rights debate 
which moves beyond the issue of basic rights and obligations to the conditions within 
which the debate takes place. Regan, for instance, argues that “…what is wrong isn’t 
the pain, isn’t the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. … The fundamental wrong is the 
system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us.”86 As Francione 
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has argued throughout his work, one of the central aspects of this system is property 
law which allows nonhumans to be seen as human property. This relationship, he 
posits, means that “trivial” human interests such as gustatory pleasure win out over 
“fundamental” animal interests like not being enslaved, caused pain or killed.87 This 
argument is a major step forward, but Francione does not pursue this argument to its 
logical conclusion. 
But this relationship goes far deeper than the interaction between individual 
humans and individual animals. Moreover, much animal abuse and killing takes place 
not due to or as a rejection of notions of animal rights. Rather it takes place in the 
sheltered, amoral sphere of the market. If one accepts that animals are commodities 
whose lives and value are governed by the market, one can sidestep the moral debate 
without rejecting it outright, thereby both perpetuating the status quo and precluding 
the possibility for debate. The problem, then, runs deeper than rights or individual 
duties. Our treatment of animals is tied to deep problems situated at the centre of 
modernity and at the heart of the machinery of the capitalist system.  
The animal rights debate is incomplete not only because it largely misses the 
structural context, but because it is not equipped to address it. This context, being 
both structural and deeply political, must be analysed and taken into account, 
however, as it directly affects how humans interact with – or use – animals. This is not 
to say that the animal rights camp does not challenge the political status quo, because 
it certainly does, but it does not sufficiently challenge the foundations of the system 
that shapes politics. And, in doing so, it misses the crucial point that animal treatment 
is not unique but rather one facet of a much bigger problem. 
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A different approach, one that avoids purely moral arguments and focuses 
instead on the tangible power relations between humans and nonhumans, is better 
suited to analyzing the treatment of nonhuman animals, particularly those which are 
executed on the guillotine of economic forces.  
 
3. Humans, nonhumans, and power 
 If problems of animal-human relations go beyond simple moral considerations, 
a new framework is needed to examine its structural roots. Here Michel Foucault’s 
seminal work on power relations and the governance of populations can help provide 
a basis for a systemic analysis that goes beyond rights and wrongs and penetrates to 
the foundations of modern society. 
 
3.1. The Foucauldian Genealogy of Power 
 Moving the discussion away from a debate about moral absolutes to one 
about the tangible aspects of human-nonhuman interaction is best approached, I 
believe, by framing this relationship in terms of the Foucauldian notion of power. Here, 
his seminal assertion that “Power is not a substance. … Power is only a certain type of 
relation” seems like a useful starting point.88 The human-nonhuman interaction, if 
viewed as a dynamic relationship of power, can be examined as a social construct 
rooted in broader aspects of modernity rather than individual relationships and moral 
duties. 
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Obviously, Foucault’s own analysis and the genealogy of the development of 
different forms of power pertain strictly to the governance of populations (within, as 
has been pointed out by, among others, Robert Young (1995) and Edward Said (1993 
among others, a specific European government and socio-cultural setting).89 However, 
his ideas about power can be applied effectively to human interaction with animal 
populations. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to very briefly sketch the Foucauldian 
genealogy.  
In Foucault’s account, the modern totality of power is achieved through a 
transition from overt sovereign power to what he terms pastoral power. As the name 
suggests, this is a power relationship of the state with its population whereby the 
state tends to its survival and needs (both as a whole and of each individual) while, 
implicitly, drawing benefit from it. This occurs in the Foucauldian genealogy through 
the introduction of disciplinary methods of power in the 17th and 18th centuries and 
what he terms biopower in the 18th and 19th centuries.90 
Disciplinary power marks a move beyond the simple enforcement of laws to a 
collection of “techniques of power centered on the body.” Applied primarily through 
institutions like prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, and so on, disciplinary power 
aims to create “docile bodies” from the individual members of a society through the 
establishment of specific norms of socially acceptable and useful behaviour, which are 
supported by specific training and subjected to observation, evaluation, and 
punishments and rewards for conformity of lack thereof. Later developments, dubbed 
“panopticism,” saw the creation of ever more complex systems of surveillance, 
examination, and “experimentation” at the level of the individual both in institutions 
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such as hospitals and workhouses and through society in general through increased 
hierarchy, the expansion of the police, and the creation of professional bureaucracy to 
manage state and social affairs.91  
While not applicable to our case – even if animals have individual traits, they 
are generally approached in theory and practice at the level of the population - it is 
important to note that for Foucault biopower is impossible without the step of 
disciplinary power. Yet with animals, the discounting of individual socio-political 
identity allows for a direct leap from sovereign to biopower. But first it is important to 
consider the notion of sovereignty itself. 
 
3.2. Sovereignty and the right to kill 
Essential to the Foucauldian conception of power is the central role of death – 
or, more precisely, the legitimate potential thereof - in governance. As noted by 
Mbembe, for Foucault, “the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides … in the power 
and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die.”92 This is not to say that 
death or killing are central or even desirable for effective sovereign governance. They 
are, in fact, literally counter-productive, representing “the very principle of excess - an 
anti-economy.”
93 Death, however, is a central, defining characteristic of sovereign 
power. Agamben defines it as “the sphere in which one can kill without committing 
murder and without celebrating a sacrifice;”94 Schmitt sees it as “the power to decide 
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on the state of exception.”95 Mbembe builds on this notion and joins it with the 
concept of hierarchization, positing that “sovereignty means the capacity to define 
who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not.”96 But to dispose of 
something one must govern it or, in the case of commodities, own them. Here 
hierarchization gives “rational objectives to the very act of killing,”97 which in the 
sphere or animal consumption might include economic gain, gustatory pleasure, or 
scientific knowledge.  
It is tempting to suggest that Foucault might term the existing human-animal 
relationship, especially one based on economic dictates, as one of “violence” in that it 
forces specific actions, imposes states of being, or closes off the possibility of others.98 
But such a conclusion would be simplistic. At best, it might apply to the individual 
human who keeps animals enclosed or chooses to kill them. But the treatment of 
animals in modern society, and especially non-proprietary animals like fish and 
cetaceans, involves broad networks of power. 
Sovereignty is a relationship between power and the individual. Even when it is 
exercised over a population, the targets of actions – the potential victims – are 
individuals. Certainly the moment an animal is killed, sovereign power is being 
deployed. But how is power – including the power to kill - extended to the population? 
This is especially important for our purposes because animals are generally treated 
not as individuals but as members of a species. Namely, as interchangeable parts of a 
biological whole. The answer lies in Michel Foucault’s theory of biopower. 
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3.3. Biopolitics and the productive population 
For the purpose of this paper, we can bypass any discussion of disciplinary 
power other than the brief description above and move onto the notion of biopower. 
Foucault argued that for a state to actually exert power – as opposed to violence - 
domestically it needed to supplement discipline with knowledge about its population. 
This meant gathering aggregate data about “men in their relations, their links, their 
imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the 
territory . . . [and] in their relation to those still other things that might be accidents 
and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death.”99  
In shifting its focus from the level of the individual to that of the entire 
population, governance was now concerned with gathering “knowledge of the state, 
in all its different elements, dimensions, and factors of power.” This included 
gathering statistical knowledge such as birth rates, death rates, information about 
diseases, and other processes affecting the body of society over time. This could serve 
as the basis for the establishment of norms pertaining to the social body.100 The 
population hereby becomes “a biological problem and … power’s problem.”101  
The goal of biopolitics is regularizing the life of the population as a whole by 
intervening at the level of “man-as-species” (“massifying” rather than 
“individualizing”). This is achieved through both regulatory and institutional means, 
with a view to increasing the population’s welfare – what Mbembe terms “the good 
life” as defined by the state - allowing it, in turn, to benefit the state. Foucault noted 
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that this focus on life and welfare marked the transition to state “power to make live 
and let die.”102  
The field of biopolitics today has broadened significantly and it is the 
broadened definitions – and suggested scope – of biopower are more useful in 
approaching my topic. Rabinow and Rose suggest that biopower is composed of 
various elements, these being “one or more truth discourses about the ‘vital’ 
character of living human beings, and an array of authorities considered competent to 
speak that truth.”103 Out of these discourses arise “strategies for intervention upon 
collective existence in the name of life and health.”104 
 Such actions, however, are not an “evolution” of other forms of power but 
rather new additions to existing matrices of power. Michael Dillon astutely argues that 
the notion of sovereignty has evolved in response to different power relations and, 
moreover, that a strict delineation of the notions of sovereign and bio-governance is 
invalid because  
“…any power over death, such as that which classically 
characterized sovereign power, must nonetheless also be 
deeply implicated simultaneously in the specification of the life 
whose death it is that it ultimately desires to command. Bio 
and sovereign power have never been dissociated. They have 
always been correlated.”
105 
 This collusion, however, means that authority over the good life – and indeed 
aspects of sovereign power - including the capacity to formulate strategies and 
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implement them are “no longer confined to those who are explicitly agents of the 
State – it apparently extends to all those who have authority over aspects of human 
vital existence.” Biopower, then, becomes “that domain of life over which power has 
taken control.”106 
It should be noted that - with a few important differences which will be 
discussed later – biopower’s focus on a biological body rather than on individuals 
means that in many respects in reduces the difference between humans and animals. 
The human disciplined, individualized entity disappears within the workings of 
biopower; the animal was never considered to be an individual. So biopower, in 
massifying both human and animal cannot help but treat them equally.  
 
3.4. Racism and the legitimation of death 
If the role of the state – and its various agents – has shifted to that of a 
shepherd of the good life, of life in general, how can death be justified? For Foucault, 
the answer is racism at the state level, defined as the introduction of “a break into the 
domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and 
who must die.”107 Without such delineation, killing cannot be legitimated as it is 
antithetical to the fostering of good, productive life. The primary role of racism, 
therefore, is “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum 
addressed by biopower.”108 This creates a relationship of war, whereby killing is not 
only justified but required. This is achieved by “appealing to the principle that the 
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death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race 
or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality.”109  
Mbembe offers the colony as an example of the rationale for racist division. He 
argues that a state of war and practices of exclusion by colonizers were perpetuated 
based on the idea that peace with savages or denizens of colonies was made 
impossible because these people had not “created a human world.”110 They had not 
created a schism between themselves and nature. 
Peter Singer offers the following definition of speciesism: “a prejudice or 
attitude of bias in favour of the interests of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species.”111 He goes on to argue that the belief in the sacrosanct 
nature of only human life is itself a form of speciesism. This is similar to the basic 
common-sense definition of racism: that one group is superior to another or to all 
others. But, as noted by Rabinow and Rose, the racism function need not be binary, 
creating a simple Us-Them divide, but rather that it “allows power to subdivide a 
population into subspecies, to designate these in terms of a biological substrate, and 
to initiate and sustain an array of dynamic relations in which the exclusion … or death 
of those who are inferior can be seen as something that will make life in general 
healthier and purer.”112 This, in fact, is the predominant role of science. Namely, 
understanding and qualifying life, be it human or non-human. As noted by Foucault, 
this is “indispensable to the ordering of natural beings.”113  
In the case of animals, biopower is sufficient to account for maintaining them 
alive for use (for instance in the case of dairy animals) or for future killing. But killing 
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within the circuits of biopower is an exception. How, then, can this narrative account 
for the regular necessity of killing in the animal meat product and scientific inquiry 
industries? 
 
3.5. Necropolitics and the shortcomings of biopower 
The seemingly all-encompassing notion of biopower is limited in that it 
assumes a governance system indeed interested in defining, promoting and 
maintaining a given population in both good and productive life. The action of killing 
becomes either a passive one (“making die”) or one based on exclusion which 
legitimizes a relationship of war (“violence”). It is an economy which “operates 
according to logics of vitality, not mortality” wherein “letting die is not making die.”114 
Underlying the seemingly inherent universality – and finality – of biopower, however, 
is a breadth of social, political, economic, and geographical relations which seem to 
defy explanation.  
 Achille Mbembe has risen to the challenge of accounting for biopower’s 
insufficiency and expanding the Foucauldian analysis of governance to its next logical 
level; namely, to the analysis of “contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the 
power of death.”115 We will now turn to a brief exegesis of his notion of necropolitics, 
which is central to the development of this paper’s argument. Mbembe’s focus is, 
broadly and symbolically, the colony. He seeks to answer the question of the political 
role of life which is excluded from political participation but which is not condemned 
to death through this exclusion.  
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In other words, how does one account for the colonial subject within the 
circuits of biopower? This is life as “an instrument of labour” or as “property,” one 
based not on a good life per se but on the creation of value. It is a life “kept alive but 
in a state of injury,” answers Mbembe. It constitutes “a form of death-in-life.”116 This 
relationship, however, cannot be contained by a biopolitical state whose goal is 
precisely the avoidance of injury. What is necessary is a change of location to the 
colony, defined by Mbembe as “the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in 
the exercise of power outside the law (ab legibus solutus) and where ‘peace’ is more 
likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end.’”117 In these regions, however, even 
the creation of value, the productivity central to the economy of biopower, can be 
excluded. Within the spatial and political exclusion of the colony, there emerges a 
relationship of necropolitics, manifested in the “creation of death-worlds, new and 
unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions 
of life conferring upon them the status of living dead.”118 
I will seek to expand the notions discussed above to the power relationship of 
humans with nonhuman animals, specifically in the economic realm. But first let us 
consider the causes and rationale for the expansion of necropower onto nonhumans. 
What forces combine to legitimize the expansion of bio-cum-necropower which, in 
turn, allow for a speciesist-racist segregation and allows for the sovereign claim to 
property and accompanying right to kill? To answer this question we must return to 
the internal logic of the system that makes science the arbiter of truth and considers 
animals to be commodities. 
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3.6. Biopower, capitalism, and reductionist science as commodification 
 As we have seen, science played a major part in the development of a specific 
form of modern thought marked by a separation of nature from society and the 
development of a market system which treats all that which is known as a potential 
commodity. But science is also complicit – directly and indirectly - in the mistreatment 
of animals and plays a central role as a source of information both in favour and 
against various policies involving animals (conservation, habitat use, hunting quotas, 
etc.). 
A first question which must be asked is why does science call for violence and 
death? Why are laboratories and oceans alike a forum for lethal research? Why is it 
that mortal sacrifice is expected from nonhumans in the name of highly debateable 
gains for either human welfare or human knowledge? Might there not be a parallel 
between the amoral commodification and its concomitant violence (toward both 
humans and nonhumans) of the economic sphere and amoral inquiry and its 
concomitant calls for sacrifice in the name of the scientific method? As Ashis Nandy 
pointedly inquires, “May the source of violence not lie partly in the nature of science 
itself?” As Nandy and others have argued, modern science acts as its own 
“justificatory principle,” and thereby becomes an end in itself. Within this closed 
system which lays claim to a monopoly on legitimate knowledge, Shiva argues, science 
gives birth to a four-fold violence: “violence against the subject of knowledge, the 
object of knowledge, the beneficiary of knowledge, and against knowledge itself.”119 
Why is this? Aran and Peixoto contend that the problem lies at the heart of 
modernity. Modern science has broken down the barrier between theoretical 
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knowledge and applied knowledge, theoretical hypotheses and technical application. 
Hereby, the “development of the experimental method has necessarily implied the 
transformation of objects under investigation into experimental subjects.”120 But 
these subjects cannot have value outside the experiment and knowledge quest. Rollin 
argues that modern science, by adopting the mantra of being “value-free” in its 
pursuit of truth can ideologically protect itself from the moral consequences of or 
debates surrounding its action – including treatment of animals – because it “can 
make no moral claims and take no moral positions, since moral judgments, too, are 
unverifiable.”121 Hereby anecdotal or other evidence not verifiable by laboratory 
experiments suggesting mentation or emotions among animals can be deemed 
illegitimate and therefore discounted.  
Shiva posits that by limiting understanding of living organisms to a totality or 
experimentally provable truths, reductionist science fails to provide a holistic 
understanding of reality and thereby cannot represent the truth about nature or even 
humanity.122 But while understanding is not total, it is precisely sufficient to 
understand what can be treated as a commodity. 
Shiva notes the explicit the link between modern science and the modern 
capitalist system. One requires all things to be treated as commodities, understood in 
terms of their potential value; the other calls for instrumental knowledge of reified 
objects, valuable as units of understanding which somehow lead to a productive goal. 
The aim of the market is to extract value from its component factors; similarly, the 
role of science is to dissect nature into its component parts, to understand by 
fragmenting. The match is uncanny: “As a system of knowledge about nature, 
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reductionist science is weak and inadequate; as a system of knowledge for the market, 
it is powerful and profitable.”123 This leads to what she sees as a “predatory treatment 
of nature” whereby the exclusive focus on maximization of gains is legitimized by 
reductionism: those aspects of a system which can generate profit must be 
understood and exploited, while those which serve natural functions like ecological 
stabilization but are not commercially viable become superfluous and therefore 
disposable. Moreover, the profit motive leads to specific mode of looking at nature, 
which then reinforces the profit motive, and so on. Shiva argues that there are no 
“neutral facts” about nature but rather that all facts are shaped by human cognition 
and economic interests.  
This argument holds for various sides of the debate, including the arguments 
posed by conservationists. As noted by Nordquist, “framing the environment in terms 
of value, intrinsic or otherwise, opens environmental politics up to cooptation through 
cost-benefit analyses and quantification of this intrinsic value.”124 Youatt introduces 
the idea that conservation and knowledge-gathering initiatives expand the reach of 
ecological biopower by bringing nonhumans under various forms of human-managed 
governance, which is inherently political, and can lead to the management coming 
under the dictates of capitalism. This (bio)politics-science-market matrix is visible 
throughout human interaction with nature in the pervasive knowledge that items 
must be studied for the sake of their potential use. Youatt gives the example of E.O. 
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Wilson pushing for the Global Biodiversity Consensus specifically so that humans do 
not “overlook so many golden opportunities in the living world around us.”125 
This line of criticism aligns with the broader argument from many camps that 
the separation of science from not only value but all of politics is not only untenable 
but actually spurious. Just as economics and science are mutually perpetuating, so are 
politics and science. Nordquist points out that this occurs through “sciences using 
social people to support and propagate its claims, and politics using natural entities to 
support its programs.”126 This is the case on both sides of the animal rights divide, as 
both use aspects of science to support their stance, and both criticize the other for 
skewing scientific truths for their own purposes.  
Peter Singer, for example, argues that reasons for denying moral agency to 
animals are eroding with scientific discoveries. In other words, he expands his notion 
that “membership of the human race is not morally relevant” by suggesting that this 
moral irrelevancy can be arrived at through rational, scientific means.127 Science does 
appear to be bearing out the notion that animals are far more intelligent and complex 
– individually and socially – than was previously held which, in turn, is challenging 
norms of how animals should be treated. Recent studies on whales and cetaceans, for 
example, suggest the existence of complex communication and social learning 
systems.128 The implication of some of the findings, like the ability among some 
dolphins to “use abstract representations of objects, actions and concepts to guide 
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their behaviour,”129 not only challenges out view of their intelligence, but also suggest 
that the notion of inter-species communication via a semiosphere not all that far 
removed from human communication might be possible. It also makes clear that the 
shortcoming in attempts to communicate with cetaceans – and by extension other 
nonhumans – is a human one based on socially entrenched misconceptions 
propagated by modern science and by the capitalist economic system. Moreover, it 
challenges the very basis of anthropocentric hierarchization and the primacy of 
human mental-social-political capabilities because it might “represent and 
independent evolution [to and from humans] of social learning and cultural 
transmission.”130  
The more we know about nonhuman socialization and intra-species politics, 
the more we can show that human interference with animals (be it through killing, 
isolation, etc.) can impinge on social development, giving a new dimension to the 
notion of possibility of suffering. Indeed, it suggests that human and animal suffering 
– and by extension interests concerned with avoidance of suffering – are extremely 
similar.  
On the other hand, the politics of science can be self-contained and totalitarian. 
Along with the claim to a monopoly on knowledge come claims to self-governance to 
protect said monopoly and, ostensibly, the purity of knowledge.  Nandy sees within 
modern science the inherent capacity to follow a path of governance incompatible 
with democracy or the “democratic rights of those who are turned into subjects of 
modern science and technology.”131 It is a propensity for the development of bodies 
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like the IWC, and the various national whaling research institutes, with their 
conflicting claims to legitimate knowledge, which in turn is the basis for political and 
economic claims to sovereignty or stewardship over a specific biomass of nonhuman 
subjects-cum-commodities. 
The embeddedness of the notion of animals as property and indeed the 
complete commodification of entire species spreads throughout industry and science 
and has spawned specialized fields of academia. A brief look at these will help shed 
light at how the economic-science-academic matrix tends to approach the use of 
nonhumans. 
 
3.7. Problematic resources: Nonhumans in the economic literature 
The academic economic literature pertaining to animals, and specifically those 
inhabiting the ocean, takes the Lockian stance as its starting point, precluding any 
discussion of the validity of or justification for treating animals as commodities. This is 
evident even from the titles of the publications themselves, such as Marine Resource 
Economics and Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. The articles in 
such publications treat animal populations as commodities in the strictest sense, 
without any discussion of the right to take animal life or, for that matter, of the 
existence of that life outside economic consideration. Animal life occurs, after all, in 
the state of Nature, which lies outside value, and therefore outside the scope of 
discussion.  
A cursory sample of such discussion reveals a few recurring trends. The notion 
that humans have a right to ownership is implicit here; property is defined as “a 
benefit or income stream” and fish are equated with other natural resources like 
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“forests, grazing lands, and water supplies.” The debate centers on “how property 
rights institutions are likely to affect economic efficiency”132 and market solutions are 
applied to “management problems” like overfishing. For instance, Matulich et al write 
that “An important benefit from privatizing open access fisheries, especially in 
fisheries managed by a total allowable catch (TAC), arises out of gains from free trade 
in which more efficient users of the resource are able to purchase rights from less 
efficient users. Such trade fully compensates the sellers.”133  
The prevalence of biopower and competing claims for sovereignty are 
especially prevalent – and transparent – in the fisheries literature and political 
discourse.134 Various groups lobby, for instance, for the right to “specialize in a 
particular species.”135 Arguments encompass both the maintenance and exploitation 
of population. Anthony, for example, argues that “a catch quota regime has the 
potential to be developed into a regime where the owners not only harvest but also 
manage the fishstock or biomass.”136 This is the linguistic bridge which joins biopower 
with necropolitics. Entire populations are maintained alive but constantly vulnerable 
for the sake of future exploitation-value-creation in a Lockian system where 
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management justifies harvesting. Naturally, the interests of the animal populations 
are not considered. Not only are the potential interests or moral/life claims of the fish 
to be exploited not considered. Questions as to “whether a regime of individual 
fishery rights is attractive to fishermen and governments” assume a priori the right to 
resource exploitation.137 The term “regime” is especially telling: it is an imposed 
system of sovereignty over a property-population not at the level of a group of 
individuals but at the level of profit-generating biomass. 
Indeed, bureaucratic or impersonal language is applied throughout. The fish 
being hunted are referred to as “stocks,” “assets,” and resources”; the fishermen as 
“harvesters”; whales and dolphins killed in the process of hunting other sea-creatures 
are termed “by-catch” with a militaristic tone that cannot help connote euphemisms 
like “collateral damage”; and states of extinction of species are hierarchized as, for 
instance, “fully-utilized resources [becoming] overutilized.” Whaling boats, tellingly, 
are dubbed “factory ships.” Moreover, even admissions of the obvious shortcomings 
of applying notions of property to a biomass are subverted. Anthony, for instance, 
admits that historically in property regimes in the fisheries, “most of the characteristic 
elements of real-world fishing were omitted, such as long-distance migration, 
anadromous escapement, predator-prey ratios, and schooling.”138 But the solution to 
this problem is one based in a science-economics-technocratic matrix which does not 
address the principal implication of the problem: namely that fish are not simply 
another natural resource. Here the life which is made into a commodity becomes an 
absent referent. Just as in Adams’ discussion of the animal which is killed being 
simultaneously supplanted and obfuscated by the language used to describe its meat, 
                                                 
137 Ibid. p.301 
138 Ibid. p.294   
  
65
so the animal life in the state of Nature disappears behind economic references, 
becoming a resource.139 Moreover, in line with Scarry’s analysis of the language used 
to describe war, the action of killing and “injuring disappears is the active rediscription 
of the event: the act of injuring, or the tissue that is to be injured, or the weapon that 
is to accomplish the injury is renamed.”140 The very potential to think in terms of 
injury – or suffering, thereby bringing in aspects of the animal rights debate – is made 
impossible by looking at the species-as-a-whole. As Scarry notes, for pain to be 
understood in must be individualized as pain, like all forms of sentience, is 
experienced within, happens “within” the body of the individual.”141 A stock cannot 
feel pain, so notions of injury are excluded entirely from the dialogue, and with them 
the entire moral debate. To borrow a phrase from Carol Cohn and apply them to this 
context, it is a language replete with “imagery that … make[s] it alright to ignore 
sentient … bodies [and] lives.”142 The language of animal exploitation inherently 
suggests a (bio)power relationship and a claim to the sovereign right to kill while 
excluding the possibility to debate this very topic. Not only that, it excludes the notion 
that divergent ideas and values exist by creating a linguistic system wherein “what 
counts is the internal logic of the system.”143 The amorality and indeed objectivity of 
the economic approach to animal life is maintained in its language and terms of 
reference. 
 This section is not intended to demonize all academic treatment of animals. 
Although much academia – the animal rights literature notwithstanding - is 
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representative of the embeddedness of speciesism in the broader modern system, in 
recent years attempts have been made to expand political theory to include 
nonhumans.  
 
3.8. Towards the integration of nonhumans into politics 
 In recent years there has been a movement, albeit an unfortunately small one, 
to extend political theory to include the nonhuman sphere, including applying various 
iterations of the Foucauldian concepts discussed above. This section will provide a 
sketch of the direction in which this movement seeks to take not only human-animal 
relations per se but also political theory in general.  
Let us begin this discussion with Rafi Youatt’s assertion that “…there is … no 
political formation that accepts the participation of nonhumans within its confines. 
The nation-state … is based around a community of humans who in turn decide what 
is right or good for themselves and [the] environment. Its reasoning is decidedly and 
openly anthropocentric.”144 What are the ramifications, in terms of political 
participation and power relations, of such a governance structure? To answer this 
question, it helps to, in following Nordquist, consider that the “nature-politics 
relationship itself is not a natural condition, but a separation reproduced and 
naturalized for centuries through much of modern political, scientific, and social 
thought and practice.”145  Through this construction, humanity and nature (including 
animals) are separated, with nature being forced into the role of Other for humanity. 
Humanity, placed outside nature, can be explained – proved - to be outside and 
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superior to nature, with nature playing specific roles to serve humanity, including that 
of “an object to be known and dominated.”146 
It goes without saying then that within such a system, “politics is not 
understood to be something that humans ever engage in ‘with’ nonhumans.”147 Not 
only that, but this very possibility is precluded. A simple yet important critique of this 
view is offered by Bruno Latour, who states that: 
“Non humans have not been emerging for eons just to serve as 
so many props to show the mastery, intelligence, and design 
capacities of humans or their divine creations. They have their 
own intelligence, their own cunning, their own design, and 
plenty of transcendence to go on, that is, to reproduce.”148 
Superficially, this is simply the preservationist argument: humans should leave 
animals alone. But it also explicitly states that animals have various properties – never 
mind that their attribution might be a tad anthropocentric – which lead to an 
overarching goal (reproduction) and to interaction to attain that goal (politics). The 
notion that animals engage in intra-species politics itself is not that contentious. 
Rather, it is the possibility that we should attempt to engage in inter-species politics 
which is problematic. Youatt and Latour also reference the work of Jakob von Uexküll 
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about umwelts149 – and more recent expansions of his work in the field of 
biosemiotics - and suggest that if human and nonhuman umwelts could be combined 
to create an inter-species semiosphere, we could move toward an interspecies politics 
based on shared meanings.150 
Other than the obvious practical hindrances to such an approach, Youatt 
argues that there is an underlying notion that accepting inter-species political 
interaction “might create new and unwanted obligations, or be seen to undermine the 
contrast of modern human politics as a realm of freedom and reason, set against 
nature as a realm of necessity and unthinking.”151 He suggests that overcoming this 
requires thinking of the entire political domain as an interspecies one, relying on 
capacities and methods of communication (in human-nonhuman interaction) which 
are not human specific 
Calling for a politics – both in definition and practice – which are ecological 
rather anthropocentric in scope, he suggests that the definition of political 
participation must be drastically altered. Indeed, simplified from exclusively the 
“politics of idea” to a “politics of presence [which] must be seen as taking place in 
forums other than human political ones.”152 He argues that actions like the 
biodiversity census and indeed science in general can be seen as a form of 
interspecies politics.153 If one accepts this thesis, it might be suggested that the 
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predominant modes of human-animal interaction, namely enclosure, killing, hunting, 
and habitat destruction would also have to be recognized as political actions. One 
might venture so far as to suggest, as a logical extension of this argument, that the 
predominant political interaction between humans and nonhumans is one of war (in 
both the Foucauldian and lay sense). 
Michael Nordquist takes a different approach, one critical of Youatt’s 
suggestion of different-yet-equal interspecies politics. He argues that a focus on 
semiotics gives nonhumans an “essentially passive role … outside of ‘signalling’ to 
humans about what might be out-of-balance in an ecosystem.”154 Indeed, Nordquist is 
critical of what he sees as the two extremes of human-natural world relations. On the 
one hand, he posits that “framing the environment in terms of value, intrinsic or 
otherwise, opens environmental politics up to cooptation”; but on the other he argues 
that “a constant state of reverence often leads to unthinking praise, uncritical 
acceptance of the status quo, and a depolitization of political questions.”155  Like 
Youatt, he seeks to expand political theory, but unlike Youatt’s approach, Nordquist 
suggests instead focusing on an opening of politics which moves beyond the 
“impenetrable boundary between human and nonhuman.” He looks to Bruno Latour’s 
work on immanence and finds that it “allows the possibility of humans and 
nonhumans occupying the same world on the same plane,”156 presumably as opposed 
to communication via the semiosphere as a gateway to political interaction. He writes 
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that: “Instead of looking at nonhumans for signals, truth, an ethical imperative, or 
intrinsic value, Latour finds a seemingly amoral analytic of the world – both ‘natural’ 
and ‘social’ now – that forces a decision about what sorts of associations and 
environments a collective wants to have and to allow.”157 He suggests, rather than 
broadening notions of communication or political inclusion or extension of notions of 
rights or personhood per se, that we should think of humans and nature as 
“ontologically of the same (and only) order and always already tied up with one 
another,” thereby avoiding debates based on and structured around this 
dichotomy.158 This, he argues, allows for a rapprochement of environmental and 
democratic politics. Nordquist and Latour’s work points the way forward to 
considering the various ways in which animals, ecology, and nonhumans are 
connected and interact. Moreover, it is potentially a first step toward a less 
instrumental approach to nature. In Latour’s terms, it is both proof of the impossibility 
- and a step toward affirming this impossibility – of the Enlightenment ideal of an 
“absolute dichotomy between the order of Nature and that of Society.”159 
Nordquist’s explicit link between democratic politics and environmental ones 
is, however, limiting. This is especially the case when it comes to considerations of the 
economic aspects of human-animal interaction, which (as was pointed out in Section 
3.6) often fall outside democratic fora/forums. Moreover, the critique of this entire 
argument might be raised that politization, seen as desirable, is itself an 
anthropocentric concept which cannot help but give primacy to human interests. 
Youatt, in a different work, takes yet another alternative approach to the 
reconceptualization of animals’ place in politics by suggesting that current efforts at 
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developing the global biodiversity census involve nonhumans in circuits of biopower. 
He suggests that although nonhumans “lack the capacity” for self-regulation (in the 
sense of being part of a system of governmentality), “like human subjects, [they] are 
regulated and rationalized in matrices of knowledge.”160 What this approach demands 
is the recognition of a process of hybridization due to the intrusion of human scientific, 
regulatory, and nonhuman techniques into the nonhuman realm, resulting in the 
emergence of human-nonhuman “ecosystemic communities.” Once they are 
enveloped in such communities and the power relations they entail, nonhumans, by 
virtue of being participants, also become sites of resistance to biopower. This, unlike 
Latour and Nordquist’s suggestion, is another attempt expand political theory to 
nonhuman and acknowledge their active involvement in the power relationships in 
which they are involved. Youatt goes on to argue, in a very important extension of his 
line of reasoning, that this resistance is due in part to the “fact that [nonhumans] no 
not live like human subjects” but also that they can escape the full reach of human-
based biopower simply by virtue of living their own lives.161 Youatt’s focus on the 
biodiversity consensus as ecological biopower, however, is but one aspect of the 
myriad other forms biopower takes. It is also a relatively “pure” version of biopower in 
that, while potentially instrumental, it does not involve direct sovereign intervention 
with animals or animal life. As will be discussed later, ecological biopower is often 
linked directly to exploitation of animal species in forms such as catch quotas and 
habitat maintenance schemes.  
The practical and theoretical implications of Youatt’s work are far reaching and 
it is worth examining them in greater depth. The first is that the expansion – and 
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recognition of the expansion – of power to the nonhuman realm demands a different 
approach to animals based on the internal necessities of biopower rather than any 
specific moral compulsion. He writes that “if biopower (in contrast with sovereign 
power) complicated the state killing its own citizens, then so too should ecological 
biopower be seen to complicate the domination of nonhumans (in modern relations 
with nature).”162 This is not to say Youatt is naïve about the implications of ecological 
biopower; while it complicates traditional (sovereign) exploitation and has the 
potential to “subver[t] the resource-driven agenda of modern capital,” ecological 
biopower not only legitimates but also “enables and rationalizes an entirely new form 
of intervention in life itself.”163 This opens up entirely new field of analysis and 
investigation and, as Youatt himself argues, means that the “bio” in biopower should 
be seen to involve all life rather than simply (some) human life. 
 
3.9. Why are human-animal power relations different? 
This section has explained the Foucauldian notion of power and demonstrated how 
how the human-animal relationship can be conceptualized along similar lines to those 
Foucauldian scholars apply to human populations. This includes subjectification, the 
use of sovereign power to legitimize killing, the expansion of biopower to study and 
intervene at the level of populations (or species), and the deployment of racism 
(speciesism) to determine which biologically defined groups may be killed in the 
interest of other races (species). But at the apex of power, in the act of killing, the 
human-human relationship differs drastically from the human-animal one. The 
purpose of power when dealing with humans is to keep them alive and kill only those 
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who are eminently undesirable or somehow un- or counter-productive in the 
economy of biopower. But for meat animals, death is necessary, it is literally the 
culmination of all of power’s efforts because it is the moment in which a commodity is 
created and value emerges out of the human labour invested in the animal life. Rather 
than being an extreme measure, death here is not only necessary but normal, 
desirable, and above all profitable. The aim of the next section is to introduce a 
concept which will allow the power-relation narrative to explain this drastic 
divergence. 
 
4. Necroeconomics 
 
 Let us look once more at the simple process whereby animals, already viewed 
by the economic system as commodities, actually become commodities. Demand for a 
product, be it meat or scientific data, demands that an animal be killed. A certain 
value chain, employing rational human actors, is put into effect. An animal is selected 
and killed. It might be a cow in a paddock or a duck in flight, but let us use the 
example of a whale. Its genus is categorized, its population is estimated, its breeding 
grounds, migration patterns, and dietary habits are logged and analyzed. It exists by 
virtue of being understood. But it also exists as a member of a species. By itself, it is 
meaningless in that it has not been given an individual meaning. It is tracked by a 
harpoon boat, which eventually, finding its target, spears the whale with an exploding 
harpoon. This “humane method” means that, when it has been towed, slowly 
bleeding to death, back to the factory ship, the whale is probably still alive and 
conscious. It will then be dragged aboard, where it might still live until suffocating to 
death. And only when it has breathed its last breath will it become a commodity. If it 
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is a minke whale, when it is no longer alive, no longer a whale, but rather “meat,” it 
will be a product worth roughly $30,000. It will also be a potential repository of 
knowledge, to be gleaned within its cells or stomach contents. It will be cut up, 
analyzed, processed, sold and eaten, moving through the same economic cycles as 
lumber or produce or oil. Its price will fluctuate with demand which, ironically, may be 
based on how many of its species are estimated to be alive by the same scientific 
endeavour which led to its death.  
What is central here is that the life of the whale comes to an end and it is at 
that precise moment that the whale becomes a commodity, that value is created. It is 
through a very peculiar economic alchemy that life is valueless until it ends. From an 
economic point of view, this is not problematic. It is natural. And yet let us attempt to 
suggest that there is indeed a problem here. A proponent of animal rights might at 
this point raise any number of arguments like the ones we have examined, and a critic 
might retort along similar lines. But instead of approaching this event from the point 
of view of the rights debate, which we have proven to be insufficient, let us bring to 
bear on it a critique rooted in the tangible relations of power which led to the taking 
of this whale’s life. 
 But how is it that humans came to kill that whale? What sort of relationship 
was established and how is it maintained?  
 In order to legitimate the killing of the whale, the hunters needed to claim 
sovereign power over it, to establish ownership. Let us recall Mbembe’s definition of 
sovereignty, namely that it is the “capacity to define who matters and who does not, 
who is disposable and who is not.”164 It is a definition in which racism is implicit as the 
mechanism which permits killing. The whale is defined as a species with certain 
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characteristics which allow us to understand it and track it, it is also understood as a 
source of meat and further knowledge, both of which have value and both of which 
require that the whale be sacrificed.  
The notions of both racism and speciesism need to be expanded when 
considered through the lens of necroeconomics. The first is the speciesism entails the 
creation by humans and for humans of a biological-cum-natural right to rule. 
Supported by various bodies of belief and science (including those with the animal 
rights debate) which suggest that there is indeed a “hierarchy of races,” the racist-
speciesist function allows for the exploitation and killing of any nonhuman because it 
first grants the right to legitimately claim sovereignty over animals by allowing the a 
priori exclusion of animals from political or moral consideration. Second, unlike in the 
Foucauldian sense – or even within Mbembe’s “colony” – the death function of racism 
moves beyond the purview and indeed beyond the sovereignty of the state. Indeed, 
both the introduction of “caesuras within the biological continuum” and the actual 
killing take place within the self-avowedly apolitical and amoral – and closely related – 
spheres of science and commerce. Even more problematically, speciesism and death 
are an integral part of these spheres. As such, it might be possible that the notion that 
human life is sacrosanct might not be the starting point for speciesism. Nor might it be 
the anthropocentric nature of these disciplines. Rather, within the sphere of 
necroeconomics, it is science and commerce which have become sui generis 
sacrosanct. 
The whale had to be made a subject and only then defined as a being which 
could be killed. But surely the whale could not have acquiesced to becoming such a 
subject and to its subsequent treatment. The answer is that the whale was 
subjectified through a relationship of war, defined by Mbembe as “a means of 
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achieving sovereignty [and] a way of exercising the right to kill.”165 It is an economic 
relationship of war aimed at achieving sovereignty over life in nature. 
But this is not a process repeated with each individual whale. Indeed, the 
whale as an individual cannot be made a subject as power cannot recognize it as such. 
This is a relationship of war which is waged against all animals in various forms and 
relies on circuits of biopower and necropolitics to establish its dominion at the level of 
the species. The first step is the understanding of and creation of possible modes of 
engagement with the whale at the level of the species via networks of ecological 
biopower. As Youatt tells us, “like human subjects, nonhumans are regulated and 
rationalized in matrices of knowledge … through which they are readied as productive 
resources for capitalism and mined as repositories of genetic information.”166 Such 
knowledge, specifically in this case understanding of migration patters and habitat 
allows humans to lay claim to life within a given biosphere and geographical area, in 
effect creating what Mbembe might term “occupation” of the commons through the 
creation of a “colony.” The state of nature which falls outside economic circuits of 
value is here brought under its dictates as a site of potential value. Within this 
relationship, animals become politically recognized, imbricated in networks of power, 
but also remain de facto powerless. Their death is here legitimated but they are 
maintained (for future use) in what Aran and Peixote term an “indeterminate zone” (a 
state of “bare life”) through mechanisms like catch quotas and temporary whaling 
moratoriums. They are maintained as living dead at the whim of economic demands. 
There is, however, a specific point at which biopower - and even necropolitics - 
in the sense applied to humans ceases to be of value in analyzing human-animal 
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relations. This is the moment of death. In contrast to the power to kill as pertains to 
humans, in the case of animals killed within the context of the capitalist system or of 
modern science, the decision to kill is not the decision about the point at which a life 
becomes without value. It is indeed, in its internal circuits of logic, not the termination 
of a life. Rather, it is specifically the creation of value, the extraction of worth from an 
otherwise valueless life. It is a process wherein death is just the first part of the value 
chain.  And it precisely here that the biopower-necropolitics account ceases to apply 
to nonhumans. Rather than death epitomising the “anti-economy” by removing 
potentially productive subjects from within power’s grasp, here power culminates in 
the extraction of value. Within the necroeconomic system, death is the economy. 
The state of exception must be perpetual because animals must be available 
for sale in the market economy – their life must always be fair game; they are allowed 
to be objects-of-a-life, and maintained as such, with the proviso that that life can be 
ended to create a necro-commodity. The necro-commodity, then, is one extracted 
from life. It is the result of “beingness” being transformed in product through killing. 
But it is more than that. It is a negation of that life. Carol Adams’ work can help us 
conceptualize this event and her work bears citing at length. She writes that: 
“Through butchering, animals become absent referents. Animals in 
name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist. 
Animals’ lives precede and enable the existence of meat. If animals 
are alive they cannot be meat. Thus a dead body replaces the living 
animal. … Live animals are thus the absent referents in the concept 
of meat. The absent referent permits us to forget about the animal 
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as an independent entity; it also enables us to resist efforts to make 
animals present.”167 
Live animals, both as a species and as individual creatures, become through 
the process of necroeconomics absent referents for the concept of commodity and for 
the notion of market value or scientific knowledge. But even more is happening here. 
As animals cease to be beings in their own right, as they fade into absentia, the 
totality of them fades as well, including their suffering and any vestiges of notions like 
rights and duties (and the attendant debate). 
As an Other, the totality of nonhumans’ experience of suffering is marginalized 
and obfuscated behind the amorality of rational processes. As Schick argues (albeit in 
a different context), animals might be said to be “passed over in pursuit of universal 
guidelines for living” and therefore, by being deprived any voice or political standing, 
be forced to “suffe[r] in silence.”168 But this is not a denial brought about necessarily 
by the denial of individual animals’ interests or rights by individual humans or through 
some sort of inclusive political process. It is a denial entrenched in a modern system 
which acts upon animals at the level of species and which, in the name of value, not 
only takes life, but, in turning it into value, makes it disappear. 
 The approach I am suggesting shows that for analytical purposes that there is 
no difference between killing of animals for science or the market as they both impose 
anthropocentric power relations, culminating in the legitimation of killing in a state of 
perpetual speciesist war, onto nonhuman populations. The necroeconomics account 
also shows that speciesism and the attendant mistreatment of animals is not simply a 
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failure of ethics at the individual or social level, but rather that it is entrenched in 
political, social, and economics structures central to modernity itself. 
 Let us apply this analytical framework to the highly contentious issue of 
whaling by focusing on the International Whaling Commission, its moratorium on 
commercial whaling, and the ongoing Japanese “scientific” whaling program. This case 
will serve as an “illustration” and not as a full application of the theory behind this 
paper. 
 
5. The IWC and “scientific whaling”: A short example 
 Charlotte Epstein, in tracing the genealogy of environmental protection, notes 
that while the earliest official environmental protection initiatives (like the 
establishment of Yellowstone Park in the US state of Wyoming in 1872) were 
preservationist in nature, utilitarianism quickly became the predominant theory of 
engagement with the wild. This shift was buoyed largely by the interest in preserving 
wildlife populations for use in hunting (including quickly diminishing “big game” 
populations in colonial Africa), with the double effect of making preservation focused 
on fauna rather than the totality of the ecosphere and of marrying “the ideal of 
preserving nature to the notion of using it.”169 By 1948, when the International Union 
for the Protection of Nature (IUPN) was established, the conservation ideal had taken 
root within policy-making circles and the duty for determining how (and how many) 
animals were to be protected fell to “scientific expertise.”170 
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 The history of whaling is a classic case of greed and short-sightedness. While 
historically numerous societies engaged in subsistence whaling, modern whaling 
revolved around the quest not only for meat but for whale oil for use in numerous 
products for the European market. In keeping with Locke’s maxim, whales were seen 
as wasted if they were not slaughtered and converted into products. As Papastravou 
explains, whalers “moved from species to species and population to population in an 
approach that has been compared to mining.”171 The actual estimates of how badly 
whale populations were reduced are a matter of debate (see below), but it is beyond 
argument that the damage to numerous species of whales was immense if not 
irreversible. Recognizing that a valuable resource was on the brink of depletion, the 
world’s whaling nations established the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The 
IWC’s policies are based on the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 
signed by fifteen whaling nations in Washington, D.C. on the second of December, 
1946. Considering that it is the document which drives much of the global commercial 
and political engagement with whales and is the centre of heated debate in political 
circles, civil society, and academia, it bears citing at length to demonstrate what 
ideology underpins it.  
The rationale the document offers for its existence is as follows: “Recognizing 
the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the 
great natural resources represented by the whale stocks … it is essential to protect all 
species of whales from further over-fishing.” The long-term aim here is to effectuate, 
through conservation and self-imposed limits, “increases in the size of whale stocks 
[that] will permit increases in the number of whales which may be captured.” This will 
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be carried out so as to “achieve the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as 
possible without causing widespread economic and nutritional distress” and thereby 
“make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.”172 It is blatantly 
clear here that the Convention has nothing to do with protecting whales at all. It is 
about allowing a “renewable resource” to renew itself to permit further extraction of 
profit. The power relations created by the IWC are laid out in the Convention’s various 
articles. First it claims a monopoly on all engagement with whales. Article 3, Section 4 
states that “The Commission may set up, from among its own members and experts 
or advisers, such committees as it considers desirable to perform such functions as it 
may authorize.”173 The right to claim sovereignty is hereby established, allowing for 
the deployment of a web of necropolitics whereby whale species are catalogued and 
studied, with the full weight of scientific inquiry brought to bear on allowing them to 
reproduce solely for the purpose of further killing-cum-value creation.  
The role of scientific expertise is enshrined in the Convention. Article IV states 
that “The Commission may … (a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize 
studies and investigations relating to whales and whaling; (b) collect and analyze 
statistical information concerning the current condition and trend of the whale stocks 
and the effects of whaling activities thereon; (c) study, appraise, and disseminate 
information concerning methods of maintaining and increasing the populations of 
whale stocks.”174  
And, if commercial whaling is ever deemed unsustainable, science is given as 
an alternative. Article V gives signatories a formal loophole: “Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Government may grant to any 
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of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales 
for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and 
subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the 
killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article 
shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.” It is telling that science here 
is ostensibly the justifying principle for killing, and yet the obvious goal of the science 
is to, in keeping with the overarching goals of the IWC, determine the health of stock 
to ascertain when it is ripe for commercial killing. But what to do with the whale when 
it’s dead and studied? It cannot, after all, be wasted. So, to close the loop: “Any 
whales taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be processed and 
the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by the 
Government by which the permit was granted.”175  
The instrumentality of the IWC’s policies is transparent, as is the inherently 
political nature of its activities. Whaling, especially under scientific pretences, is in and 
of itself political and concerns pre-meditation of profit via cultivation and harvesting 
of necrocommodities. As Shiva has argued, “[p]icking one group of people (the 
specialists), who adopt one way of knowing the physical world (the reductionist), to 
find one set of properties in nature (the reductionist/mechanistic), is a political, not a 
scientific, act. [And yet it] is this act that is claimed to be the 'scientific method.'”176  
Epstein puts it succinctly when she states that the IWC was established using a 
“Weberian rationalization of nature use” based on a model of scientific rationality 
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founded in a Cartesian domination of nature.”177 To use a clichéd but in this case apt 
metaphor, this is akin to putting a commission of wolves in charge of the henhouse. 
This system is the epitome of the necroeconomic interspecies relationship. A 
species is selected as being of value and therefore the legitimate target for killing. This 
is accompanies by the realisation that said species is a finite resource and as such 
must be protected in a system that combines biopower and necropolitics in that the 
species must be to some degree – based on scientific data and estimations – kept alive, 
but it is kept alive solely for the purpose of reproducing and therefore naturally 
creating more potential commodities which can then be plucked from nature. The 
focus is on the total population rather than its individual members and therefore the 
suffering and death of individual animals is precluded from consideration. Questions 
of morality are supplanted and assuaged through claims of sustainability, backed by 
scientific testimony (which outwardly preaches concern for animal welfare but 
internally is the barometer of how much death can be meted out to ensure 
profitability). This system is perpetuated through the scientific-commercial 
combination, both within the IWC and within the various non-member whaling 
governments. Most criticism within this system is levelled precisely at any politics 
entering the system and disrupting it within notions of public interest in animal 
welfare or of animal rights, which the system is designed to exclude.  
 In 1982, the majority of members of the IWC voted to implement by 1986 a 
moratorium on commercial whaling and the establishment of whale sanctuaries 
wherein any commercial whaling would be illegal. The moratorium has been in place 
for the past 26 years and is the source of fierce debate, which has brought the whaling 
issue to the forefront of social consciousness. While a number of countries abide by 
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the moratorium, reactions have been mixed. Norway withdrew from the IWC and has 
resumed limited commercial whaling in 1994 (which is bolstered by scientific “lethal 
research” on whale stocks). Japan, while remaining in the IWC, has continued whaling 
under the “scientific whaling” clause, setting its own catch quotas. Although 
Norwegian comment is noted, the focus in this section is on Japan, who, by staying 
under IWC regime, employs a seemingly sophisticated rationale for its continued 
whaling and sale of the “scientifically” caught whale meat. Many commentators refer 
to this as simply a guise for commercial whaling, but if it is a guise, it is one whose 
rationale goes deeper than simple politics. 
Garner posits that most forms of conservation have two interrelated tenets: 
they work at the level of the species rather than individual animals (whose suffering 
can be ignored by focusing on the welfare or size of the population as a whole) and 
focus on those species which can benefit humans over those which cannot.178 He also 
argues that conservation of animals like whales, which are no longer necessary per se 
in that they are not an essential food source or commodity, is problematic because in 
these cases it is in the commercial best interest of the businesses involved to exploit 
quickly and move on to invest money in other resources. It is once most of the 
damage has been done that conservation or preservation initiatives are launched. He 
points out that in the case of the IWC, “species are protected only once stocks … are 
virtually exhausted and it is not commercially viable to continue taking them.”179 How 
then, is whaling of the scientific variety justified in the face of overwhelming evidence 
of severe depletion of whale stocks? Why do whales need to die to prove something 
that is already known? 
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Before examining the Japanese case, let us first suggest that there is little 
consensus regarding the science of conservation. There is a serious debate under way 
within scientific circles about the usefulness and accuracy of estimations of 
populations and moreover on the correct approach to “sustainable” exploitation of 
resources. Ludwig et al posit that “we shall never attain scientific consensus 
concerning the systems that are being exploited.”180 
Consider that the current moratorium – and supposedly scientific whaling 
programs – are based on population estimates which vary dramatically between 
studies depending on methodology or timing. For example, Clarke and Knight note 
that the IWC’s estimate of the total humpback population before any whaling started 
is 20,000. The current population is estimated at about 10,000, leading some to 
suggest that a limited hunt is possible in the near future. Other studies, however, have 
placed the pre-whaling population at 240,000.181 Similar discrepancies occur in the 
reporting of whale catch, especially in the politically sensitive area of bycatch.182 
Considering this discrepancy, setting a “target for managed recovery” seems like a 
purely political exercise. Garner suggests that the basis for the IWC catch quote 
system is “guesswork” and that decisions regarding whales “are more to do with 
political expediency and economic self-interest.”183 Moreover, quotas or catch levels 
based on notions of maximum sustained yield (MSY) set at the population level – a 
necropolitical occupation – do not in practice translate into sound conservation (or 
sound biopower) as techniques and distribution of catch is often difficult to control. 
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Palumbi notes that whale populations include small, locally isolated populations which 
“cannot support a loss rate that may seem minor on a whole-ocean scale.”184 Here 
scientific data can in fact act as a faulty guide for necroeconomic interests which do 
require that a population be maintained in a state of living death rather than actually 
be wiped out. 
 It bears noting that science in this case seems hardwired to link its findings to 
commercial action wile disavowing a political or moral motivation, even when the 
latter is evident. Let us examine the criticism of any opposition to whaling presented 
by Butterworth. He argues that the whaling issue “is not really a conservation, but 
rather an ‘animal rights’ issue” backed by groups opposed to the killing of “special” 
animals.185 Here we see the deployment of the “charismatic megafauna” argument in 
conjunction with the explicit belief that consideration of animal interests or any 
politics on behalf of animals do not belong in the conservation calculus (as it cannot 
be allowed to be debate). This extends into a criticism of the entire IWC’s – admittedly 
flawed – decision-making process, which he argued is conducted in a scientific guise, 
but that it comes down to an impasse between those wanting to protect animals 
(unscientifically) and those “wishing to preserve industries, employment, and a food 
source based on whales” by adhering to scientific conservation and catch quota 
models.186 Here it becomes clear that supposedly neutral science is being cast as 
actually being on the side of good and of economic welfare, which is inherently 
supposed to outweigh any animal interests. He suggests such “hidden agendas” might 
undermine science, but he himself suggests that science can give an answer without 
being posed a question. Namely, how many whales can be killed. The embeddedness 
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of instrumentality in modern science’s epistemology is so severe that even legitimate 
scientific findings are criticized for suggesting the need for inaction. Butterworth 
writes that current risk estimations for whales are too strict and that the “general 
application of equally risk-averse criteria to all marine fisheries would necessitate 
immediate closure of the overwhelming majority.”187 So science is only right when it 
leads to tangible action, which leads to commercial gain.  
Also consider the explanation for the study of whales’ stomach contents given 
by a professor of physiology at the University of Oslo. He states that because whales 
can compete with human fishermen for fish at certain times of the year, studying their 
diet “is not perhaps a major scientific goal in itself; but from the fishing industry’s 
point of view it is fairly important.”188 
The Japanese official position, examined through the necroeconomic 
framework, lays bare the workings of the scientific whaling regime and its internal 
contradictions. Take the comments of Hiroshi Hatanaka of Japan’s Institute for 
Cetacean Research defending the Japanese whaling program.   
Hatanaka writes that “[r]esearch on whales is conducted according to 
provisions of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and is 
fundamentally different from commercial whaling.”189 This is only a fact within the 
framework of the IWC’s claimed monopoly on whales and, moreover, considering the 
necroeconomics argument, we see that the whale as a commodity for science is no 
different than the whale as a commercial commodity, making Hatanaka’s point not 
only invalid as a defence but altogether untrue. 
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Hatanaka goes on to suggest that scientific whaling is carefully planned so as to 
“achieve statistically valid results while also safeguarding population.”190 Here we see 
the biopower aspect clearly as the good of the population, represented by a scientific 
estimate of population health, is held up as proof that killing in the name of science is 
not only justified, but does not harm the population, sidestepping the death and 
suffering of individual animals. Moreover, because the whales are sold, this scientific 
break-even point is also sui generis an economic one as well, proving again that 
scientific whaling is commercial (necroeconomical) in all but name.  
Hatanaka goes on to contend the “lethal method used for sampling is required 
to achieve our research objectives.”191 Here science is offered by as a justification for 
killing, again not allowing for consideration of either the suffering caused or even of 
death per se. Note the term “lethal research” rather than the more truthful – since 
the research itself is not the cause of death – “murder by harpoon.” Moreover, critics 
cast doubt on the usefulness of the scientific data obtained through such research, 
either for management purposes or even at all (Papastravou 2005). 
The actual site of the killings – what Mbembe refers to as “zones of exception” 
- is also justified.192 Hatanaka argues, using truly perverse logic, that the sanctuary 
does not apply to scientific whaling and was intended solely to prevent commercial 
whaling. So not only is science and the purported extraction of knowledge given again 
as a justification for death, but there is a claim laid to the ability to deal death in a 
specific geographic area in a necropolitical relationship. Moreover, this claim is 
legitimated in the internal logical of Hatanaka’s argument by a scientific procedure 
which exists solely for the purpose of determining whether the commercial motive for 
                                                 
190 Hatanaka. 
191 Hatanaka. 
192 Mbembe. p.34 
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the same death can be replaced as the justificatory principle. He is differentiating 
between two identical situations. 
Ironically, Hatanaka lays it all out in the open at the end of his letter, when he 
writes that “[r]esearch of [this] magnitude … is costly. Funds may be obtained by 
selling the by-products of the whale research.” But here the by-product he is referring 
to is the whale meat, which is the commercial product. While the terminology and the 
internal logic might differ, the two are one and the same. The by-product is the 
product! Science, then, is commerce, with both targeting whales as a commodity. 
Both are politically and financially motivated and both deploy political means when 
these serve them. But when they do not, they hide behind claims of amorality, the 
pursuit of truth, or anthropocentric appeals to economic welfare. It is not that whales 
are denied rights or a treatment they deserve; it is that the system does not allow for 
these to be considered in pursuing its goals.  
 Ludwig et al capture the essence of the anthropocentric nature of the 
necropolitical arrangement when they argue that “[it] is more appropriate to think of 
resources as managing humans than the converse” in that “resource problems are not 
really environmental problems: they are human problems that we have created at 
many time and in many places, under a variety of political, social, and economic 
systems.”193 
Conclusion 
 This paper has traced the genealogy of the modern human-animal relationship 
and its implications for the political economy of animal products. While  
                                                 
193 Ludwig et al. 
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acknowledging the importance of the contribution of the animal rights debate in 
improving the treatment of animals through the use of moral-rational reasoning, it 
has shown that this debate is insufficient in that it largely ignores the root causes of 
speciesism and animal mistreatment. Having traced these to the central facets of 
modern capitalism (and its corollary, modern science), this paper contended that a 
different analytical framework was necessary to address these. 
 This new framework is rooted in the work of Michel Foucault and Achille 
Mbembe and demonstrates that animals are in fact imbricated in complex power 
relationships which allow human economic interests to claim them as property and 
legitimize their death. In death, animals killed for meat, scientific knowledge, or other 
sources of value, become necrocommodities. In other words, their death 
simultaneously marks the end of their being and the creation of value for market. A 
corollary of this process is that the suffering and death of the animal, indeed the 
animal itself, becomes an absent referent for the wealth into which it is transformed. 
This closes the circuit whereby the animal can be treated as a commodity in a system 
which is avowedly amoral. I have hereby introduced the notion of necroeconomics. An 
application of this framework to the case of the IWC and ongoing scientific whaling 
regimes shows that the root of the problem lies not in a lack of respect for animal 
rights but rather within a system which does not allow for these to even be 
considered. 
 The necroeconomics account is by no means intended to replace the animal 
rights dialogue, but neither is it merely an extension thereof. It could be seen to 
complement certain arguments within that debate, but it also provides its own 
narrative of the human-nonhuman relationship. 
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There a number of implications of this approach.  First, it connects the abuse 
and killing of animals to broader problems of modernity, including reductionist science 
and modern capitalism. What is required, then, is not simply a change of attitudes 
toward animals, but a reshaping of political economy. It also shows that the human-
animal relationship is not simply the result of a failure of ethics, but rather part of 
deeper structures. As such, the necroecomics account challenges the constructed 
notion of amorality in commerce and in the sciences and their obvious 
anthropocentricity.  
Considering the degree to which this narrative shows animals to be implicated 
in power relations with humans, it also suggests that far greater academic efforts 
should be dedicated to examining the implications of human politics for animals and 
the potential for animal involvement in these processes. It also suggests that perhaps 
a shift toward approaching animals as both individuals and members  of a species 
might force us to acknowledge their death and suffering in a more profound way. 
Rather than neglecting, as Schick suggests is the case, the “concrete suffering of 
particular individuals,” we should see animals more as we see ourselves. If in death 
they have a name, then perhaps further deaths can be avoided. Finally, this analytical 
could theoretically have implications for bioethics and the treatment of genetically 
created organisms and for the debate about ecosystem depletion.  
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